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Substitution over Time: Another Look at
Life-Cycle Labor Supply
1. Introduction
Today macroeconomics relies almost exclusively on intertemporal mod-
els, models which are also quite common in other areas of economic
inquiry. One important question that must be answered in the building
of a dynamic model is "What are the possibilities for substitution over
time?" This paper is about one potential margin of substitution, the
substitution of work over time.
An analysis of the substitution of work over time dates at least back to
Hicks (1939, Chapters XVI, XVII), and since Lucas and Rapping (1969)
this margin of substitution has been included in a substantial number of
macro models. The presence of this margin affects predictions for labor-
market and output fluctuations in response to aggregate productivity
shocks (Hall, 1980; Hansen, 1985), to changes in the timing of taxes
(Judd, 1987), to changes in the timing of government spending
(Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum, 1992; Barro, 1981, 1987; Baxter
and King, 1993), and to monetary shocks (Lucas, 1972), as well as many
other questions of substantial interest. But since a series of studies by
Altonji (1986), MaCurdy (1981), and Abowd and Card (1989) and analy-
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ses of tax experiments [some of which are surveyed by Hausman (1985)
and Pencavel (1986)], it has been widely believed that the substitution of
work over time is a quantitatively unimportant margin. This belief and
its origins can be seen in Pencavel's (1986) and Card's (1994) surveys, in
the comments by Ashenfelter (1984), Mankiw (1989), and Plosser (1989),
and in the calibration of macro models by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987,
p. 50), Judd (1987), and many others exploring the consequences of
some interesting and important policy changes.
This paper revisits the life-cycle evidence—evidence on low-frequency
changes in wages and time worked with age. My goal here is not to
reconcile the variety of life-cycle and non-life-cycle studies that are avail-
able [I do attempt this in another paper, Mulligan (1995)]. Nor is my goal
to argue that the substitution of work over time is the single missing
piece for every macroeconomic puzzle. Instead, I revisit life-cycle evi-
dence to show that it is consistent with quantitatively important substitu-
tion of labor over time. Although I do not think that life-cycle evidence is
necessarily the best evidence for getting at this issue, it is true that the
widely cited studies based on the PSID and other micro data sets are
basically life-cycle studies. I then show that the usual cohort data might
be reasonably modified in several ways, including the aggregation of
micro measures of labor supply, taking account of time spent training on
the job, using different techniques for measuring work time, measuring
marginal tax rates, and including older workers.
Although the usual cohort data are consistent with a lot of substitution
over time, there are some problems with their construction. There is no
obvious way to infer the wages of those who are not working at various
points in the life cycle. Nor is it particularly plausible that tastes, health,
and other relevant variables are independent of age or even uncorrelated
with wages. Nor is it particularly obvious exactly what procedure should
be used to obtain the "right" estimate from the usual cohort samples.
These problems are enough to make one eagerly search elsewhere for
anticipated wage changes and associated changes in work. My search
led me to another life-cycle event that has not yet been studied: the
termination of aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) at the
18th birthday of a family's youngest child.
1 Section 4 explains how this
study can alleviate some of the apparent problems with a synthetic-
cohort sample, that it is consistent with substantial substitution over
time, and—perhaps surprisingly—that its estimates are similar to the
synthetic-cohort estimates.
1. I have also been led to look at the anticipated wage changes associated with non-life-
cycle events, including seasons, wars, and agricultural shocks (Mulligan, 1995).Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 77
2. A Life-Cycle Model of Labor Supply
2.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERTEMPORAL
SUBSTITUTION HYPOTHESIS
The intertemporal substitution hypothesis (ISH) can be simply stated:
workers intertemporally reallocate their work in response to changes in
the relevant relative price. A statistical model that captures this idea is
(i)
where n\ is the labor supply of worker i at date t, w\ is worker i's date-t
after-tax market value of time, and rt is the real rate of return to savings
between periods t and t+1. The term e, includes preference parameters
and, in some models, a precautionary motive for working, a > 0 is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). In many environments,
labor-supply decisions are made sequentially in time rather than at the
"beginning of time," so the law of demand more appropriately applies to
plans for labor supply as a function of anticipated wages. Et denotes date-f
expectations of future variables and is therefore included in equation (1).
Notice that the model does not necessarily predict that workers will
work the hardest when the conventionally measured "real wage" is the
highest. There are two relevant forces at work. First, the relative price of
leisure in any two periods depends not only on the ratio of the wages but
also on an interest rate. Second, through the taste term et, the model
allows for impatience, prudence, or other reasons that workers may
have different preferences for current and future leisure. Consider, for
example, a perfectly flat time profile for wages. A worker will choose
more leisure in the later periods if the interest rate is high enough, or
more leisure in the earlier periods if he is impatient enough. Without
data on the interest rate and preferences, it is necessary to estimate the
trend component of the intertemporal labor allocation together with the
responsiveness of work effort to incentives.
Beneath any notational complexities, the econometrics of estimating
the elasticity a is also quite straightforward: identify situations with
different anticipated rates of wage growth, and measure the associated
differences in anticipated labor-supply growth. The implementation of
this can be quite challenging (e.g., how is anticipated wage growth
measured?), but the thought experiment is simple enough. I (and many
others in the empirical literature) do not intend to say or do anything
more complicated than this, but a more complicated model is needed to
be clear about the measurement of the variables of interest and interpre-78 • MULLIGAN
tation of the parameter a. My life-cycle model includes several complica-
tions necessary for understanding the data: (1) uncertainty about future
wages, (2) various measurement errors in hours and wages, (3) discrete
choices about labor-force participation at various points in time, (4) time
aggregation in the measurement of labor supply, and (5) potentially
nonlinear labor income tax schedules.
2.2 INDIVISIBLE LABOR
A person's lifetime includes many potential work sessions, equally spaced
in time. For our purposes, it may be useful to think of a potential work
session as a day or week, although a month is in some ways a more
convenient definition for the AFDC application in Section 4.3. If work is
to occur during a potential session, it must occur for exactly n units of
time. This indivisibility of labor might be interpreted as the optimal
bunching of labor in continuous time in the presence of fixed commuting
costs and high-frequency fatigue effects (see Mulligan, 1998), in which
case n is a function of the magnitude of the fixed cost and of the form of
the fatigue effects, but not the other variables in the model such as
wages, taxes, or tastes for leisure, w denotes the average product of labor
for the session, so that wn is the total amount produced by a worker who
chooses to work the session, w and n may vary over time and across
states of nature.
2.3 HUMAN-CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
Two things can happen during a work session: goods production or the
production of one's own human capital. When goods production occurs,
the worker is paid wn. When human-capital accumulation occurs, the
worker may or may not be paid, depending on whether the firm is
financing the training or not. If the firm does not finance the training,
the worker does not have any earnings for that session but still values
the training for the future earnings it produces. In this case, I let wn
denote that valuation.
2
In Section 3, I use two measures of time spent producing human
capital. The first is time spent searching for a job. The second is time at
work spent learning new things.
2.4 TIME AGGREGATION
It will be assumed that the econometrician observes only time-
aggregated measures of the relevant variables, so it is convenient to use
2. Human-capital accumulation can be valued more than wn without changing the interpre-
tation of my results, although see my discussion of time aggregation.Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 79
two indices t and k to identify a potential work session, t indexes the
time-aggregated periods, or time intervals, and varies for 0 to T during a
consumer's lifetime, k indexes the potential sessions within any particular
time interval and varies from 1 to K for each t. Thus there are a total of
K(T+1) potential sessions in a consumer's lifetime.
2.5 TAX AND BENEFIT SYSTEM
During any potential session, a consumer receives government transfer
payments in the amount btk (the consumer is a net taxpayer in the case b
< 0). Benefits are determined according to the formula
\btk, \k - Rtk max I wtikntikltk - dtk, 0 I j , (2)
where wtk is the average product of time during the /cth session of time
interval t (time which may be spent either in goods or human-capital
production), ntk is time worked, ltk is an indicator variable for goods
production or firm-financed human-capital production, Itkwtkntk is labor
earnings, dtk are deductions from earnings and earnings disregards, Rtk is
the benefit reduction rate or marginal labor income tax rate, btk is the maxi-
mum benefit available (and in some applications may be a function of
family composition, asset holdings, and other variables), and jb, *. is the
minimum benefit available. Benefits are reduced Rtk dollars for every
dollar of net earnings, where net earnings are computed as gross earn-
ings net of deductions.
Notice that earnings and deductions are not aggregated across ses-
sions for the purposes of computing taxes and benefits. I note in the text
where this assumption may be unrealistic and of some consequence for
the results.
2.6 UNCERTAINTY, BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, AND
UTILITY FUNCTIONS
I index a realization of a consumer's life history by o). For each possible
realization wEfl, consumer choices of stochastic processes for consump-
tion ctk((o), work ntk{a>), and tax deductions dtk((o) must satisfy a present-
value budget constraint:





nt,M] = A0, (3)
t-1 K
s=0/=l
In Qtk(cj) s-XS [rsJ((o) - p] - 2 K/M - p],
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where rtk is the ex post real return on a one-period bond purchased at
date t,k-l, and Htk is an indicator variable for purchases of self-financed
human capital. In addition to (3), we have the constraints (2) and ntk{u>)
G {0rntk(o))} for all t=0, . . . ,T, k=\, . . . ,K, and w G O.
Deductions are costly. Deductions in the amount d cost ftk(d,o)). For
each t,k,(o, the deduction cost function is nondecreasing and
nonconcave in the amount deducted. There is no cost if no deductions
are taken.
The revelation of information over time is modeled with the filtered
probability space (fi,^,F,7r). Each state of nature &> has unconditional
probability 7r(a>). The filtration F={3
?01/ WQi2, . . . ,$FTiK} on Q is assumed
to be increasing, and the stochastic processes wtk, ntk, ytk, rtk, \k, Rtk, and b tk, are adapted to it.
3
Consumption and work are assumed to evolve as if workers chose
functions ctk{(o), ntk(a)), and dtk{cS) adapted to the filtration F with the
objective of maximizing the expected value of an intertemporally and
intratemporally separable utility function (4) subject to the constraints
(2), (3), and ntik{a) G {0,ntk(a>)}:
T K
2 *(*>)21e-«
tK+k) \ uUk(a>)) - yt>k(a>)v ( nt»
wen t=ofc=i L \ / / \
p > 0, v{0) = 0, vtk((o) = vl ntk((o) j > 0.
Notice that I do not treat Htk and Itk as choice variables and do not say
exactly how sessions devoted to human-capital production translate into
higher future wages, but the first-order conditions of the problem de-
scribed above are among those of the larger problem that include opti-
mal human-capital accumulation over the life cycle.
4
2.7 WHEN TO WORK
When describing the decision to work, it is useful to define rtk(u>) as the
implicit tax rate on work in session k of time interval t
Ttk{o>) = mm , Rt,k(co)
I wtJc(o))ntk((o)
, Rt,k(co) wtJc(o))ntk((o) wtJc((o)ntJc((o) J _
min
3. The random function/, k should be measurable with respect to 3%^.
4. See Ghez and Becker (1975). The larger problem with Htk and Itk as choice variables has
the constraint Hlkfltk = ltkntk for all t,k,co.Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 81
If btk is large enough (in what follows, I suppress the index cu), the
implicit tax rate is related to the benefit reduction rate Rtk. However, when
positive deductions are optimal and the deduction cost function is
strictly concave, the indivisibility of labor means that the implicit tax rate
is strictly less than the benefit reduction rate. If btk is small enough, Ttk is
unrelated to Rtk.
The first-order condition determining where ntk equals 0 or ntk is
7t,k vt/k ^ Qt,k wtM ntik (1 - TtM) EtikXtik, (6)
where Etk denotes date-t,k expectations and Aa is the lifetime "marginal"
utility of wealth.
5 The expression (6) simply says that people work dur-
ing those periods when the benefit exceeds the cost. The benefit of
working is the discounted after-tax earnings (or the value of self-
financed human-capital production) for session k of interval t, given by





n be interpreted as generating a substitution effect, while
changes in Etk\tk can be interpreted as generating a wealth effect.
2.8 CONSUMPTION INSURANCE?
The problem described above presumes that insurance against surprises
to wages, taxes, and interest rates is unavailable.
6 It is straightforward to
allow for perfect consumption insurance by collapsing the series of bud-
get constraints (3) into a single budget constraint that equates the ex-
pected present value of expenditures to the expected present value of
resources. In this case, the lifetime marginal utility of wealth, \tk, is no
longer a random variable with respect to
 (3>tik (that is, Etk\tk = \tk). Other-
wise the conditions for working session k of interval t is the same as (6).
2.9 INFORMATION LOST FROM TIME AGGREGATION
Given time-aggregated lifetime data on all of the exogenous variables of
the model, we cannot make sharp predictions about time-aggregated
labor supply without answering three questions:
5. Because of its discreteness, the labor-supply decision at any date and state has a discrete
effect on expected remaining lifetime discounted utility of consumption, and \tk is the
size of this effect per dollar of date-i,fc after-tax earnings wlkntk(l-Tlk). The value of \tk approaches the "marginal" utility as wtkntk{\-Ttk) goes to zero. Mulligan (1998) also shows that Xtk is literally a marginal utility when particular lotteries and "taste insur-
ance" contracts are introduced as choice variables.
6. Although one of Mulligan's (1998) interpretations of equation (6) presumes that "taste
insurance" or some other mechanism is available to compensate those who are unlucky
enough to especially dislike work when wages are high.82 • MULLIGAN
1. How is information about future wages and interest rates revealed
during a time interval?
2. What is a worker's market value of time at each potential session,
including those sessions he did not work?
3. What is a worker's nonmarket value of time at each potential session?
I make three assumptions about this:
(Al) No information is revealed within time intervals: &tk = 9% a for all
k = l,...,K.
(A2) The market value of time and the indivisibility of labor do not vary
within time intervals: Qtikwtkntk(l-Ttk) = Q(,iWufiu(l-Tu) and ntk = ntl for all k = 1, . . . ,K
(A3) ytk = Jtgtic, where o-\ngtk, k = 1, . . . ,K, are drawn according to the
distribution function G with unbounded support, cr > 0 is a con-
stant. E[cr In gtk] = 0 and E[(a\ngtk)
2] = 1. Without loss of general-
ity, the K draws are assumed to be independent.
Assumptions (Al) and (A2), although often only implicit, are extremely
common in the labor-supply literature. (A3) produces increasing mar-
ginal disutility of work within a time interval, an assumption which
appears in one form or another in the literature. To see mechanically
how (A3) produces increasing marginal disutility, notice that, given (Al)
and (A2), workers that work at all during a time interval will work
during the low disutility sessions. Since sessions differ in their marginal
disutility, workers require a higher wage to work a larger fraction of the
time interval.
7 I use (A1)-(A3) to derive some empirical specifications,
but comment further on their relevance as I discuss the empirical results.
In accordance with assumption (A2), I suppress the subscript k except
where necessary for clarity.
2.10 CONSUMER HETEROGENEITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
LABOR-SUPPLY EQUATION
Consumers may differ in their realizations of the exogenous variables ivtk
and ytk. They are the same regarding the stochastic processes generating
these realizations, the utility functions u(c) and v(n), the parameter a,
and the way in which information arrives (including the function G
defined above).
Consider a group of consumers who are identical in terms of the two
7. Lucas (1970, p. 25) has exactly the specification (A3), except that he has a continuum of
potential work sessions per time interval (as compared to my K).Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 83
random variables ytvt and Qtivtnt(l — Tt)Et\t. We compute the group aver- age Nt of each individual's time worked during the time interval t, includ-
ing those who did not work at all during the interval:
G"
1 — =o-ln wt{\ - rt) + aln nt
V Knt ) ytvt
(7)
This is a nonlinear version of MaCurdy's (1981) "A-constant labor supply
function," which may be surprising given MaCurdy's apparently differ-
ent description of the labor-supply problem. In fact, the only difference
is in the measurement of labor supply.
For a group of consumers who, for some integer s > 0, have the four
random variables ytvt, Qtwtnt(l - Tt)Et\t/ Et[yt+Svt+S], Et[Qt+swtnt+s{l - rt+s) \t+s]
in common, we have a version of equation (1):
Et




s'=i in C\ — T^ a "v 7)
+ o{Et In Et+S\t+S - In EtEt+s\t+s).
The only difference between an individual's labor supply plans and
those of the group is the sampling error due to the fact that a single
individual only samples K times from the distribution G during a time
interval. The probability that a particular individual does not work at all
during a particular time interval is
Thus extended intervals of participation and nonparticipation during a
person's lifetime are evidence of either (a) large and persistent changes
in tastes or the value of time or (b) a large willingness to substitute over
time, a.
The responsiveness of labor supply to wages depends on the level of
labor supply in the model (8). Typically there will be little response of N
when N is near 0 or Kn. This is even true in the special case that g°k is
distributed uniformly on [0,e] and the equation (1) obtains—a special
case which gets a lot of attention in the literature—once the possibilities84 • MULLIGAN
of corner solutions for Nt and Nt+S are taken into account.
8 The bulk of my
analysis follows Altonji (1986), Ghez and Becker (1975), MaCurdy (1981),
and others by focusing on this special case and ignoring possible corner
solutions. My Section 4 returns to the more general model (8) and in-
cludes some analysis of how the responsiveness of labor supply might
vary with its level.
The derivation of equation (8) reveals several points that are quite
relevant for the empirical applications in this paper:
1. The market value of time, wt, for the time interval t can, for those who
have some earnings during the interval, be measured as yt/[Nt(l—ht)],
where ht is the fraction of sessions worked that were devoted to self-
financed human-capital production, and yt is the total pretax labor
earnings for the time interval.
2. a measures the responsiveness of anticipated labor-supply changes to
anticipated wage changes, not ex post labor changes to ex post wage
changes.
3. The implicit tax on work has the benefit reduction rate or marginal labor
income tax rate Rtk as its upper bound.
4. The derivation shows how time aggregation is related to the measure-
ment of labor supply, wages, tax rates, and other variables.
5. The derivation shows how measured employment and hours are
related.
6. Those who are not working during any particular work session are
not a random sample of the population, but are those for whom work
yields a greater disutility.
7. The derivation shows the effect of consumption insurance on
comovements of wages and labor supply.
2.11 MACRO "EXPERIMENTS" TO BE CALIBRATED
FROM LIFE-CYCLE DATA
Before reviewing empirical studies and proposing ways to improve
them, something must be said about why life-cycle substitution is of
interest for macroeconomics. One item of substantial interest is the re-
sponse of aggregate labor supply to aggregate temporary shocks to the
market value of time. Candidate shocks to the market value of time
include productivity shocks such as those in Kydland and Prescott
(1982), monetary shocks such as those in Lucas (1972), temporary govern-
ment spending shocks such as those modeled by Hall (1980), Barro
8. See Smith (1977, p. 249) for a discussion, and Rogerson and Rupert (1991) for estimates
of a labor-supply model with corners at year-round work.Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 85
(1981), and Baxter and King (1993), an income-tax cut that is phased in
over time, or a tax or subsidy on savings. Computing the response to
these shocks probably requires a general equilibrium model of which my
model (8) would be one piece, but the parameter a in my model is the
most crucial ingredient. When we, for example, compare two equilibria
(which differ, say, according to the processes generating policy or pro-
ductivity shocks) which have different anticipated rates of growth of the
after-tax discounted market value of time, a will—up to an aggregation
bias term—measure the cross-equilibria difference in anticipated rates of
aggregate labor-supply growth. This paper uses various life-cycle data to
estimate a. Whether the world actually exhibits the temporary wage
fluctuations predicted by these models is an interesting empirical ques-
tion, but one beyond the scope of this paper.
Although very high-frequency nonseparabilities can be used to moti-
vate my indivisible-labor model (see Mulligan, 1998), labor supply
should be separable over time at low frequencies in order for the degree
of intertemporal substitution found in life-cycle data to be the same as
that applicable to higher-frequency temporary wage movements. If, for
example, nonmarket capital were accumulated while a person was not
working and that capital increased the marginal utility of leisure, then
people would be more willing to substitute time over long periods than
over short periods. Or if, as modeled by Kydland and Prescott (1982),
extended nonmarket time lowered the marginal utility of leisure, then
people would be more willing to substitute time over short periods than
over long periods.
The model also has strong predictions for consumption which have
been the subject of extensive testing in the literature (e.g., Friedman,
1957; Hall 1978, 1988; Shea, 1995). One area of testing relates to the
responsiveness of consumption growth to interest rates and is intimately
related to my analysis of labor-supply growth. However, variations in ex
ante real interest rates that are uncorrelated with tastes and other rele-
vant variables are even tougher to find than are variations in anticipated
wage growth. Furthermore, my model is perfectly consistent with lots of
substitution of work over time but little substitution of consumption
(just set a large and make u" highly negative).
A second area of consumption testing relates to the predictions of the
permanent income hypothesis for the effect of income shocks on con-
sumption. But, because the consumption side of the model could easily
be modified to include intertemporal consumption nonseparabilities
(e.g., Becker and Murphy, 1988; Becker and Mulligan, 1997) or even
consumption-leisure nonseparabilities (Heckman, 1974; Ghez and
Becker, 1975), a variety of observed responses of consumption to income86 • MULLIGAN
shocks are consistent with the hypothesis that labor supply is correlated
with anticipated wage growth.
If workers in my data were literally unable to transfer resources across
periods by borrowing, saving, or consuming assets, then the static
model of labor supply would apply period by period (whatever "period"
means). The sign and magnitude of the synthetic cohort correlation be-
tween work and wages would depend on offsetting "income" and "sub-
stitution" effects, and, assuming the income effect is positive, the regres-
sion (10) would underestimate a in my synthetic cohort data.
9 As dis-
cussed below, a would be overestimated in my AFDC samples, because
the income and substitution effects are in the same direction.
3. Synthetic-Cohort Samples
3.1 INDIVIDUAL-PANEL AND COHORT CROSS-SECTION
APPROACHES COMPARED
There are two approaches that have commonly been used to estimate tr
(with pretty similar results), and each has its advantages. The first fo-
cuses on equation (1) and uses individual panel data. Anticipated labor-
supply growth is measured as actual annual hours growth for those
working at t and t+1 (as reported in the survey), and anticipated wage
growth is estimated in a first-stage regression of the growth in actual
average hourly earnings on a variety of variables presumed to be in the
date-t information set. However, it is important to note that, among
those variables that have been used to predict wage growth, functions of
age are the best predictors. To see this, consider Altonji's (1986) predic-
tion of average-hourly-earnings growth in a sample of 10,036 continu-
ously married prime-aged man-years from the 1968-1981 waves of the
PSID. With two socioeconomic indicators for parents, years of schooling
of father and mother, age, a schooling quadratic, age interacted with a
schooling quadratic, and year dummies as explanatory variables, his
prediction equation has an R
2 of 0.0054 and a standard error of 0.254. In
other words, the standard deviation of his predicted wage growth is
0.0187, which can be compared with the standard deviation of average-
hourly-earnings growth of 0.037 in my CPS synthetic-cohort data for
cohorts aged 25-60, and 0.087 for cohorts aged 25-79.
1
0 Hence, among
9. An exhaustive list of tests of "liquidity constraints" is beyond the scope of this paper,
but I point out that an inability to transfer resources across periods would also imply
extraordinary rates of return to schooling and OJT (on-the-job training), a prediction
which is at odds with the empirical findings of Mincer (1974) and others.
10. It is interesting to note that, if the intertemporal substitution elasticity of hours were as
large as one and the intertemporal model fitted Altonji's data perfectly, the standardAnother Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 87
the variables that have been used in the literature to predict wage
growth, age dummies have the vast majority of the explanatory power.
This, of course, does not rule out the possibility that someday someone
will use the PSID or other individual-panel data to identify quantita-
tively important anticipated wage changes that are not associated with
age.
The second approach studies cross-sectional cohort ("synthetic co-
hort") specifications motivated by equation (7). First, we make the de-








 €>W -T't)) = 0, (9)
where i indexes individuals and a denotes a person's age. Second, as-
sume that g°k is distributed uniformly on [0,e] (or, equivalently, integrate
equation (1) over time], and obtain (10) by averaging (7) across consum-
ers of the same age:
In N"t = a In vft + (1 + a) In nt + In K + atat + e\ + A% (10)
where N" is the cohort arithmetic-average annual hours worked, vft is the
cohort geometric-average after-tax market value of time, and A"t is a
within-cohort aggregation bias depending on the second and higher
moments of the within-cohort distributions of et and In wt.
u A very
similar expression can be derived relating arithmetic averages of work
hours to arithmetic averages of after-tax market values of time, but I use
the geometric average uft because it can be decomposed in a straightfor-
ward way into geometric averages of tax factors, measured pretax
wages, and proportional measurement errors.
1
2
Treating n and K as constants in the cross section and assuming that
the aggregation bias is uncorrelated with uft across cohorts, equation (10)
is then estimated by least squares in the cross section of workers aggre-
gated by cohort. Notice that age is included in the regression because—
deviation of log hours growth would be 0.0187. This is the difference between no wage
growth and the growth of annual hours from 2000 to 2038.
11. A" = In {1 + 2/,r2[/4(e) + oV"(ln w)]/il}, where fx^e) is the ith moment of the within-
cohort distribution of e, and /u"(ln w) is the ith moment of the within-cohort distribution
of In w.
12. Similar regression estimates of cr are obtained when arithmetic averages are used. Even
if the aggregation bias term were correlated with uft, an estimate of cr inclusive of that
correlation may be the more relevant for macroeconomic forecasting because macro
data are by definition, aggregated.88 • MULLIGAN
as mentioned in the above discussion of equation (1)—the ISH has noth-
ing to say about the rate of growth of labor supply that would occur in
the absence of growth of the after-tax value of time. Age is also included
in the regression (10) because cohorts may differ in their time-f tastes or
their expected lifetime marginal utility of wealth, Et\t.
The slope parameter a in equation (10) is a well-defined structural
parameter in my life-cycle model. Indeed, contrary to the claims of Smith
(1977, p. 249), cr is a parameter of an individual's preferences—it de-
scribes the amount of intertemporal heterogeneity in his marginal
disutility of work (see also Lucas, 1970). a also dictates the response of
aggregate labor supply—including all its components (the fraction work-
ing sometime during the year, weeks worked conditional on working,
weekly hours, etc.)—to temporary wage fluctuations, as well as the
welfare implications of those fluctuations. Most important, the value of
a is the major determinant of the response of macro variables to tempo-
rary monetary, fiscal, technological, and other shocks.
Assumption (9) is crucial, so it deserves some interpretation. It says
that those tastes for work and interest rates which cannot be explained
by a linear term in age are uncorrelated with after-tax market values of
time. Part of this is effectively a recursivity assumption—that, given
wage growth, workers of all ages trade off working this period or next in
the same way. But (9) is also an assumption about cohort effects.
13 Assump-
tion (9) is violated, for example, when health affects tastes for work and
health deteriorates at an increasing rate with age (i.e., recursivity is
violated) or the detrended expected lifetime marginal utility of wealth,
EtA", varies with date of birth in a way that is correlated with detrended
uft (i.e., cohort effects do not follow a trend). A weaker assumption than
(9) can be used when proxies for tastes or interest rates are included in
the regression (10). The presence of cohort effects can also be tested by
obtaining cohort cross-section estimates at different points in time. Mulli-
gan (1995) does so and finds similar regression estimates of a for 1979,
1980, and 1985 (which are in turn similar to the 1976 estimates reported
here).
The cross-section approach has three important advantages. First,
cross-section studies offer a number of interesting and highly relevant
variables—such as measures of health, training, and alternative mea-
sures of time use—that are unavailable in panel studies. Second, cross-
section samples are typically much larger than panel samples, so older
workers may be more reliably studied and a much richer relationship
13. Depending on the interpretation of A,, (9) may also limit the length of a time period or
the degree to which A, diminishes with lifetime wealth. See Mulligan (1998).Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 89
between age and wages can be accurately estimated in cross sections.
Third, some of the disadvantages of cross-section data can be overcome
by complementing the cross sections with some information from panel
studies.
Another difference between individual-panel and cross-sectional co-
hort analyses is that the latter is subject to a composition bias due to the
death of cohort members and (because in practice the market value of
time can only be observed for those who work sometime during the
year) the variation across age groups in the fraction and types of indi-
viduals who are employed during the year. However, I argue in Section
3.6 that cross-section cohort data can be supplemented with individual-
panel data to correct for the composition bias.
Both individual-panel and cross-sectional cohort studies must make
inferences about the market value of time when a man is not working.
When someone is not working at instant t, it is typically assumed that
the market value of time can be inferred from earnings during some
other nearby period or from the earnings of a similar person who is
working, or some combination of these. But it might be the case that a
person's market value of time when not working is low compared to the
time he does work or compared with the market value of time of appar-
ently similar people who are working. I see no solution to this form of
"selection bias" for the individual-panel and cohort studies in the litera-
ture or for my own cross-section cohort study, but point out that another
advantage of my panel study of welfare mothers in Section 4 is that we
can be confident that changes in the tax rules dominate any unobserved
changes in the market value of time.
I begin by revisiting the cross-section cohort (synthetic cohort) sam-
ples, sticking with the same basic specification (10) but emphasizing the
measurement of the key variables of interest. First, I include the employ-
ment margin in my measures of labor supply as suggested by my model.
Second, I include income and social security taxes in the calculations of
the value of time. Third, I assume that average hourly earnings mis-
estimates the value of time in a way that is related to the amount of time
training on the job. Fourth, I consider the possibility that hours worked
as reported by employees to standard demographic surveys are system-
atically biased. Because many of the data needed to address these issues
are only available in micro cross sections, I am necessarily constrained to
construct cross-section cohort samples instead of individual-panel sam-
ples. But, fifth, I do use panel data to supplement the cross-section data
and address a measurement problem that is peculiar to the latter—
composition bias. I return also to an individual-panel sample later in the
paper.90 • MULLIGAN
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Formally, I decompose cohort fl's geometric-average after-tax market
value of time, w% into five components:






w"t = pretax CPS average hourly earnings,
1-T( = tax factor,
1/(1—/i") = correction for those reported hours that are self-financed OJT,
v] = correction for CPS hours reporting error,
B"t = composition bias.
Below I show how w], l — r", and B
at are computed as cohort geometric
averages from micro-level data, and h"t is computed as an arithmeticAnother Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 91
average from micro-level data. N"t and N
at are computed as cohort arith-
metic averages from separate micro data sets, and then their ratio is used
to compute v\.
3.2 TOTAL LABOR SUPPLY IN A CROSS-SECTION OF COHORTS
Figure 1 displays hours worked for male cohorts aged 20-80 in 1976.
w
The solid line displays CPS average annual hours for all men in each of
61 age brackets. Because annual hours worked are zero for some men,
this solid line lies below the dashed line, which displays average annual
hours for only those men who worked positive hours in 1976.
The CPS cohort geometric mean of average hourly earnings (which are
measured only for those working positive hours in 1976) are displayed
as a solid line in Figure 2. Judging from the cross-sectional data dis-
Figure 2 MALE PRETAX MARKET VALUE OF TIME BY AGE GROUP
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
CPS hourly earnings, "employees"
CPS hrly earn'DI OJT factor
— — - CPS hrly eam*Heckman OJT factor
CPS earn*Heckman OJT factor/DI hours
CPS hrly earn*DI OJTComp Bias factors
14. The cross section is the March 1977 CPS (ICPSR study 7784). Hours are measured as
"usual weekly hours last year" times "weeks worked last year." Average annual earn-
ings is measured as "earnings last year" divided by annual hours.92 • MULLIGAN
played in that figure, wages almost double between ages 20 and 40. CPS
annual hours worked by "employees" shown in Figure 1 increase, but
more modestly. The increase in average hours by all between ages 20 and
40 is more substantial, almost doubling. The data in Figures 1 and 2 sug-
gest that both hours and wages fall dramatically between ages 55 and 80.
Using the 1960 Census 1/1000 Public Use Micro Sample (PUMS), Ghez
and Becker (1975) study the hourly earnings of employed white men aged
22 to 65. They compute the average annual hours and average hourly
earnings by age for the men in their sample. In a regression of each age
group's log average hours on its age and its log average pretax average
hourly earnings, they obtain a wage coefficient of 0.39.
1
5 When the log of
leisure (5096 minus annual hours worked) is used as the dependent vari-
able, they find a coefficient of 0.25. Because they study samples of em-
ployed men, measure annual hours and earnings, and isolate the wage
variation that occurs with age, Ghez and Becker's specification is essen-
tially the same as those of Altonji (1986) and MaCurdy (1981) (subject to
the caveats mentioned in Section 3.1 above).
My cohort analysis begins with 1976 annual hours and earnings as
reported in the 1977 CPS. In a regression of each age group's log average
hours of employees on its age and its average log pretax average hourly
earnings of employees, I report a wage coefficient of 0.37 in the first cell
of Table 1 for a sample of men aged 25-55. Like Ghez and Becker's, my




However, hours of employees are difficult to interpret in my life-cycle
model and may be of limited interest for making predictions for the
aggregate labor supply N
at. For example, the hours of employees are
constant over time and equal to n in the special case of K—l, while the
aggregate labor supply might be quite sensitive to temporary wage
changes. When aggregate labor supply is measured as in the model—
annual hours averaged across all men, including those who did not work
during the year—I obtain a cr-estimate of 0.57.
Heckman (1993, pp. 116, 119) suggests that changes in labor supply
15. They smooth their data by taking three-year moving averages. Their more widely cited
estimate of 0.45 is obtained when income and family size regressors are included. See
their Table 3.5.
16. Our samples sizes are quite similar: they have 33,591 men and I have 34,654 men. I
include all men regardless of race and do not smooth my cohort data by computing
moving averages. Estimates of a obtained with 3-year moving averages (not reported
in this paper) are typically 20% larger than the corresponding estimates reported here.
Ghez and Becker (1975) also include workers aged 56-65, but, since retirement ages
have fallen over time and the importance of social security has grown over time (Costa,
1998, Chapter 2), my aged 25-55 sample is probably the better comparison.Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 93





























































































1. IES estimates are coefficients from regressions of log age-group hours on age and age-group workers'
average log after-tax average hourly earnings. Earnings and hours (inclusive of OJT) from the 1977 CPS.
2. Marginal tax factor A is one minus the 1976 Federal individual income tax (IIT), and social security old
age, survivors, disability, and hospital insurance (OASDI & HI) tax on an additional dollar of gross
earnings minus—for those aged 62-71 and receiving social security—the implicit marginal tax of social
security benefits.
3. Marginal tax factor B is marginal tax factor A plus the accumulation of social security wealth (SSW)
asociated with an additional dollar of gross earnings.
4. Average tax factor A is the increment to 1976 IIT, OASDI & HI, and the implicit tax on social security
benefits that would result from not working at all during 1976, as a fraction of 1976 gross earnings, plus
one.
5. Average tax factor B is an age-weighted average of average tax factor A and marginal tax factor B.
6. The log of each tax factor is averaged across workers within each cohort to obtain a cohort tax factor.
See Appendix A for more details of the computation of the four tax factors.
7. Employees are those men reporting positive work hours and average hourly earnings between $1 and
$100 for calendar year 1976.
8. SRC OJT is cohort average self-financed on-the-job training, computing from the 1976 Time Use
Study as indicated in the text.
9. Heckman et al. OJT is on-the-job training inferred from earnings panel data for young men. See
Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998).
over the life cycle consist of changes at both the intensive and the extensive
margin. This is not true in my model, in which all changes are at the
extensive margin. However, my model, Heckman's discussion, and Cole-
man's [1984] and Alogoskoufos's (1987a,b) studies of business-cycle fluc-
tuations agree that annual hours worked by those working positive
hours is not the same as aggregate labor supply and that the difference94 • MULLIGAN
between the two—the fraction of workers who work positive hours
during a year—may also respond to wage fluctuations. And the larger
elasticity estimates in my Table 1 for "all" as compared to "employees
only" confirm Heckman's (1993) life-cycle conjecture.
1
7
CPS estimates of a are sensitive to the number of older age groups
included. Table 1 reports estimates about twice as large for samples aged
24-64.
1
8 After introducing data on taxes and health, I return in Section
3.8 to some of the differences between young and older workers.
3.3 TAXES AND INCENTIVES TO WORK OVER THE LIFE CYCLE
One difference between CPS average hourly earnings and the after-tax
market value of time, wt(l — Tt), is the labor-income-tax factor 1 — T,. This
factor can vary with age because of the progressivity of the federal
individual-income-tax system and its dependence on marital status, be-
cause of the regressivity of social security payroll taxes, and because of
the effect of age on the rate of accumulation of social security wealth.
Four components of federal tax and benefit rules are included in my
calculations of the tax factor:
1. Individual income taxes




3. Implicit taxation by social security benefit formulae from earnings
limits (applies only to men aged 62-71 who receive a social security
benefit) and inadequate delayed retirement credits (applies only to
men age 65-71)
4. The accumulation of social security wealth (applies to men under age
72)
The fourth component is the least straightforward, both because the
rules are complicated and cohort-specific and because computation of
the tax factor requires information about workers' expectations of future
benefit formulae. I therefore report calculations with and without this
fourth component.
17. Given the maximum feasible work during a time interval (Kfl), the parameter K dictates in
my model how aggregate labor-supply responses are partitioned between employment
and employee hours. For K=l, employment is the entire response. For, say, K=2, em-
ployment is half of the response at the margin for a group with an 89% employment rate.
18. Depending on the specification, including the four age groups 20-23 or excluding some
of the younger age groups affects estimates of a, although not systematically in one
direction or another. These results are available from the author.
19. It is assumed that the earnings data measured by the CPS are net of employer social
security contributions.Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 95
The accounting period for individual income and social security taxes
is a calendar year. If potential work sessions coincide with the tax ac-
counting period (as they do in my model), then incorporating taxes into
the estimation of a is fairly straightforward [see equation (5)], although
the CPS does not provide much information about the deductions that
families might be taking from their individual income tax or the costs
they bear in the acquisition of those deductions. I therefore assume that
all families take the standard deduction and, according to equation (5),
compare the taxes paid with taxes that would be paid if the man's earn-
ings were set to zero. This produces an average-tax-rate measure of the
tax factor.
Another implication of a long work session is that the decision to work
before age 62 typically has a negligible effect on the accumulation of
social security wealth. 1976 earnings affects social security benefit formu-
lae by affecting the lifetime average of one's top index earnings years
(AIME). If someone plans to work most of his prime-age years, then not
working a long session in a particular year can only affect the AIME by
dropping that year from the calculation and adding another year to the
calculation.
2
0 I therefore exclude SSW from any calculations of the aver-
age tax rate.
If the tax accounting period includes multiple potential work sessions,
incorporating taxes into the estimation of cr is significantly more compli-
cated. In one extreme (and counterfactual) case, however, the appropri-
ate tax factor is one minus the marginal tax rate on an additional dollar of
earnings.
2
1 Shorter work sessions also imply that a work decision might
have an important effect on social security wealth, so I include one
computation of the marginal tax rate that includes the effect of work on
SSW. Three of the four measures of the tax factor used in my analysis
are:
MA. Marginal tax rate, PIA fixed (IIT, OASDI and HI payroll, phaseout
of OA benefits)
MB. Marginal tax rate with accumulation of SSW (IIT, OASDI and HI
payroll, phaseout of OA benefits, and accumulation of SSW)
AA. Average tax rate (IIT, OASDI and HI payroll, phaseout of OA bene-
fits, and effect of retirement decision on OA benefits)
20. In the extreme case that a worker's earnings during the years he works grows at the
same rate as the national index, this substitution of one year for another has zero effect
on AIME and therefore zero effect on SSW.
21. This special case requires that the marginal tax rate be a continuous function of earn-
ings [otherwise one has to allow for the "kinky" behavior described by Hausman
(1985)] and that each tax accounting period include very many potential work sessions.96 • MULLIGAN
My model supposes that K and n are the same for all age groups, but
another interesting model might allow n to increase with age (while
holding Kn constant). The growth of n with age would, for example,
explain why the employment rate appears to be (at least in CPS data) a
relatively more important margin for the old than for the young, even
before the "old" reach age 62. I therefore consider a fourth measure of
the tax rate that averages the tax rates MB and AA with the weights
depending on age:
AB. Age-weighted average of MB and A A
The four tax rates for each cohort (one minus the within-cohort geo-
metric average of their corresponding tax factor) are displayed in Figure
3. With the exception of men aged 65-71, average rates (AA) are lower
than marginal rates (MA and MB). But what is more relevant for estima-




1-geo avg Marg tax factor A
1 -geo avg Avg tax factor A
1 -geo avg Marg tax factor B
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tion of a is the change in the tax rate with age, and we see that average
rates (AA) rise more rapidly for prime-aged men, a difference which can
be attributed to the fact that marginal rates are well above average rates
for young men and taxable income is rising with age and, for the tax
measure MB, the increased rate of accumulation of SSW with age.
2
2
Rates of change of the four tax series differ most at ages 62-65. Here
average tax rates remain relatively low because most men have not yet
retired by age 61 and retirement at age 62 is not particularly encouraged
or discouraged by social security benefit formulae. For ages 65-71, how-
ever, the social security disincentive for work in the following year is
pretty large—over 90% of a year's benefits are lost by delaying retire-
ment one year (Appendix A). Thus Figure 3 displays low cohort-average
tax rates except for ages 65-71. Marginal tax rates increase a bit at age 62
because some of the men who do begin to take social security still earn
above the earnings limit and are subject to an additional 50% marginal
tax. As men age, more are in this situation, so cohort-average marginal
tax rates continue to rise in Figure 3.
It is important to note that none of the series in Figure 3 fully capture
the work disincentives of social security. One consequence of the social
security benefit formulae is that some men aged 62-71 switch to part-
time jobs to keep their earnings at or below the earnings limit. The part-
time jobs have lower hourly pretax wages, so a man's acceptance of a
part-time job—which shows up in Figure 2 as a lower pretax wage—is
itself a tax even if he does not pay a dime of the 50% tax implicit in the
social security benefit formulae. Thus there are a variety of ways one
might partition the after-tax market value of time, uft, into a pretax com-
ponent and a tax factor; my Figures 2 and 3 are only one such way.
Estimates of a derived from the various tax factors are shown in Tables
1 and 3. The sign and magnitude of the effect of including the tax factor
depends on the method of its calculation. To the extent that detrended
tastes for work do vary with age (even in a way that is uncorrelated with
pretax wages), the tax accounting period differs from the period of labor
indivisibility, and the tax system is progressive, 1 — rt is negatively corre-
lated with e, and estimates of a derived from the various tax factors are
biased downwards.
3.4 ON-THE-JOB TRAINING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE
My empirical analysis so far treats a worker's productivity growth as
exogenous. It is quite plausible that the increase in productivity of young
22. See Appendix A for some details of my calculations, and Feldstein and Samwick (1992)
for a study of the accumulation of SSW.98 • MULLIGAN
men is due to the accumulation of skills over time and that the decrease
(or slower growth) in old age is due to depreciation and low levels of skill
accumulation. If time is an important component of skill accumulation
and skill accumulation occurs on the job, then the correlation of skill
accumulation with age leads to a problem with the interpretation of life-
cycle wage estimates such as those as the solid line in Figure 2. The
problem is that worker productivity is estimated as the ratio of earnings
to hours spent at work but some of the hours at work are not spent
producing and are not compensated by the employer. Younger men are
presumably engaged in the most skill accumulation, so that their produc-
tivity is underestimated the most. As men age, the underestimation is
mitigated as skill accumulation time falls. For this reason, the growth of
the market value of time of young men is overstated.
2
3
Few data are available on time spent training on the job, and even less
on the question of who finances that training. A 1976 study of time use
by the Survey Research Center (SRC) asked study participants two rele-
vant questions
24:
(i) "Do you feel you are learning skills on your job that could lead to a
better job or to a promotion?" (IF YES) "Sometimes people learn
these skills as part of their regular work, while others use time at
work to learn skills that are not part of their regular job. About how
many hours per week do you usually spend learning new things as
part of your regular work?"
(ii) "And how many hours per week do you spend learning new things
that are not part of your regular work?" (Stafford and Duncan, 1985,
p. 284).
Under the assumption that 100% of the hours reported as a response to
(ii) and 50% of the hours reported as a response to (i) are not compen-
sated by employers, I display as a solid line in Figure 4 the total hours of
worker-financed training time for each of 61 male age groups.
23. Jacob Mincer has made this point in several studies (including Mincer, 1974, 1977),
distinguishing between average hourly earnings ("wages") and the market value of
time ("capacity wages") and deriving implications for the life cycle pattern of hours and
earnings. Ghez and Becker (1975, pp. 94, 100) and Heckman (1975, p. 228) also make
this point in their studies of labor supply, but Heckman treats training time as unobserv-
able, while Ghez and Becker correct for the bias only by including age squared in
equation (10).
24. The 2406 respondents are the same 2406 respondents who filled out the time diaries
that are the object of my study in Section 3.5 below, although the two OJT questions
were part of the questionnaire and not part of the diary section of the study (my sample
sizes are also smaller because I use only men and require that the necessary variables
have valid codes).Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 99
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Rather than attempting to measure time spent training on the job,
Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) infer OJT time from the earnings
growth they observe in a panel study of young men. Figure 4 displays
their estimates as a dashed line. Because their method of measuring
training time is so different from the SRC survey method, it is a nice
complement to the SRC measure, although it should be noted that the
Heckman-Lochner-Taber measure is derived from a model with exoge-
nous labor supply.^
The 1976 SRC OJT data are first smoothed by regressing OJT on a
quadratic in experience, and then the two OJT estimates are used to
adjust the CPS estimates of the after-tax market value of time according
to equation (11) and displayed in Figure 4. Both measures result in a
substantially reduced rate of growth in the after-tax market value of
25. Heckman (1975, p. 255) reports estimates of training time derived from a model with
endogenous labor supply that are very similar to the numbers in Heckman, Lochner,
and Taber (1998). Heckman (1975, p. 251) also reports another set of estimates which
are very much like the SRC numbers before age 30 and like the estimates in Heckman,
Lochner, and Taber (1998) after age 30.100 • MULLIGAN
time, and the data of Heckman, Lochner, and Taber actually imply a
decline in that value of time between the ages of 20 and 23. Not surpris-
ingly, larger estimates of a are reported in Table 1 when OJT time is used
to adjust CPS average hourly earnings. The OJT numbers of Heckman,
Lochner, and Taber typically make the biggest difference.
2
6
Consistent with the models of Ben-Porath (1967) and Mincer (1974),
my measurement of OJT implicitly assumes that human capital is accu-
mulated through training time that cannot be used to produce current
output. But an upward adjustment of the value of time that declines
with age and hence flattens the profile of the life-cycle value of time can
be derived from a number of other accumulation models, including
those with learning by doing, signaling, or firm financing of some
general training [see Rosen (1972) or Gibbons and Murphy (1992)].
3.5 HOURS-REPORTING BIAS
It has been argued by Juster and Stafford (1991, p. 496), Stafford and
Duncan (1985), and others that life-cycle studies of labor supply are
sensitive to the method of measuring labor supply. In particular, they
claim that larger life-cycle changes in hours are found in time-diary data
than in CPS-type survey data.
There are a variety of reasons one expects the time-diary estimates to
be more accurate than measures based on CPS-type surveys. First, CPS
respondents merely answer the questions "How many weeks did you
work last year?" and "In the weeks you worked, how many hours did
you usually work?"
2
7 whereas time-diary respondents are obligated to
account for all of their time in a particular day or days. The stereotypical
response of "40 hours" might be expected for the CPS respondent, but
such a response by a time-diary respondent would create inconsistencies
in his diary unless he actually worked 40 hours [although Pencavel
(1986, p. 14) suggests that common reports of 40 are real and the result of
legal restrictions]. Suppose, for example, that a time-diary respondent
works more than 40 hours in a week. A response of "40 hours" would
leave a hole in his schedule, which he would have to fill by fabricating a
26. Notice that log CPS hours are still used as the independent variable, as suggested by
my model, where OJT yields disutility just like other work.
27. CPS respondents are also asked about hours worked in the week prior to the interview,
but there is no corresponding earnings question (for example, there are many CPS men
who did not work in the week prior to the interview but had substantial earnings in the
prior calendar year). One might use log CPS cohort hours last week as the LHS variable
in equation (10) and CPS average log hourly earnings last year as the RHS variable.
Slightly higher IES estimates are found, but closer to those reported in the first two
columns in Table 1 than to those in the last two columns [results available upon
request; see also Mulligan (1995)].Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 101
story for what he was doing when he was actually working. Casual "40
hours" responses by CPS respondents would generate the appearance
that hours do not fluctuate over the life cycle. A second reason to prefer
the time diary is that an attempt is made to measure travel time, coffee
breaks, lunches at work, and other activities done "at work" while not
actually working. A third advantage of the diary data is that it measures
time devoted to finding a job. According to my model, time spent search-
ing for a job is work even though it is not compensated. A fourth reason
that CPS annual hours are misreported is that they include time spent on
paid vacation or sick leave. Fifth, there is some evidence that—aside
from the distinction between weeks worked and weeks paid—workers
make systematic errors in their responses to retrospective questions
about weeks worked (Horvath, 1982).
I suggest four separate corrections for hours-reporting bias. The first
and preferred method discards CPS hours all together and computes age-
group hours from a study of time use. Figure 1 compares the reports of
1977 CPS respondents with results from a 1975-1976 SRC time-diary
study by age group. 624 male respondents completed time diaries for
three or four days between October 1975 and September 1976. Total min-
utes of "normal work," "work on a second job," and "unemployment
activities" were summed over the diary days, weighted in such a way as to
represent a seven-day synthetic week.
282
9 The sum does not include min-
utes spent on coffee breaks at work, eating lunch at work, or commuting.
There is more idiosyncratic variability in the diary data, which is certainly
due to (1) the smaller sample sizes used to compute age-group means and
(2) the greater micro-level variation in diary hours. But it seems clear that,
as compared to the CPS survey, somewhat more hours are measured for
younger men by the diaries and substantially fewer hours for men nearing
retirement age (1976 hours for men aged 50-64 are 1448 in the diary, and
1685 in the CPS). This second discrepancy with the CPS is consistent with
Ruhm's (1990) study of bridge jobs (switches away from career occupation
or industry) and, for those aged 62-64, his study of partial retirement
(periods of employment separated by spells of retirement).
28. My sample is larger than that of Stafford and Duncan (1985) because, apparently, they
restrict attention to people aged 64 or less with "regular work schedules," exclude
"supplemental respondents," and use only one of the four waves of the 1975-1976 time
study.
29. I assume that each respondent's three or four diary days are randomly chosen from the
year (actually they're chosen from October, November, February, May, June, and Sep-
tember), so that the SRC's calculation of minutes per synthetic week is a calculation of
minutes per representative week. I multiply minutes per synthetic week by 52/60 to get
annual hours. Mechanically, the scaling up is done first by the SRC, who computes
minutes per representative week, and then I multiply by 52 and divide by 60 to get
hours per year.102 • MULLIGAN
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1. IES estimates are coefficients from regressions of log age-group hours on age and age-group workers'
average log market value of time. "All" sample (workers and nonworkers) is used.
2. No tax or OJT factors are used.
"When diary hours are used to compute the wage (first two rows), log CPS wage instruments for the
corrected wage.
fcFrom Table 1.
Table 2 shows that the elasticity of hours (workers and nonworkers)
with respect to the CPS hourly wage is about 1.4 for the 25-55-year-old
sample and larger for samples that include older men. Elasticities of 2 are
typical when the CPS hourly wage is corrected using the SRC OJT hours
(see Table 3), and even larger when Heckman, Lochman, and Taber's
(1998) numbers are used (not reported).
3
0
Like those based on CPS hours, estimates of a based on diary hours
are sensitive to the number of older age groups included, and this sensi-
tivity can be seen in Tables 2 and 3. The diary estimates are even more
sensitive to the truncation of older workers in the 50-64 age range,
because this is the largest discrepancy between CPS and diary hours.
If it is true that the life-cycle hours profile is misestimated with CPS
data, then average hourly earnings are also likely to be misestimated.
Ideally, one would like to discard the CPS hours data from the computa-
tion of average hourly earnings and replace them with diary data, but,
due to the relatively small sample size, Figure 1 shows that the age-
grouped diary data are fairly idiosyncratic. This means that average
hourly earnings computed with diary data would be idiosyncratic and in
a way that is correlated with idiosyncratic errors in measured hours. One ap-
30. As is obvious from Figure 1, there is substantially more sampling error when time-
diary cohorts are used to estimate cohort hours. Not surprisingly, OLS standard
errors for a are larger, typically between 0.2 and 0.6, as compared to a typical range of
0.02 to 0.25 when CPS hours are used. Of course, serial correlation and a number of
first-stage estimation errors mean that OLS standard errors overstate the precision of
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proach is to instrument for log (CPS earnings/diary hours) with log (CPS
earnings/CPS hours) in the regression of diary hours on average hourly
earnings. We see in the first two rows of Table 2 that doing so substan-
tially increases point estimates of o\ However, because of the poor fit of
the first-stage regression, the magnitude of the increase is quite sensitive
to the tax factor, OJT factor, and sample used.
Diary age-group sample sizes are fairly small, with as few as 5 men
and 18 days sampled in any single group aged 24-55.
3
1 The typical age
group samples 12 men and 47 days. Hence, my second and third correc-
tions for hours-reporting bias are of some interest, because they do not
rely on grouping the diary study by age. Both methods assume a model
of hours-reporting bias, calibrate the model by comparing histograms of
reported hours for 365 diary men and 23,899 CPS men aged 25-55 report-
Table 3 ESTIMATES OF a INCLUDING OLDER MEN, WITH TAX, OJT,





























































































1. OJT is cohort-average self-financed on-the-job training, computing from the 1976 Time Use Study as
indicated in the text.
2. See text for details of computation of composition-bias correction of wages.
"Coefficients from regressions of log age-group hours on age and age-group workers' average log after-
tax market value of time. "All" sample (workers and nonworkers) is used.
'See Notes to Table 1 and Appendix A for explanation.
•Health regressors are age-group averages of hours spent on personal care and four indicators of
physical condition.
rfUses arithmetic-average rather than geometric-average CPS wage.
Tersonal-care hours omitted.
31. Among groups aged 56-69, only the aged-63 group samples fewer days, 8.104 • MULLIGAN
ing positive hours, and infer the true hours elasticity from estimated CPS
hours elasticities. The first model is a compression model, assuming that
reported hours h is closer to some stereotypical number n than is true
hours n for those whose true hours are positive: In n — In n = 0 (In n — In
n). The second, the liars model, assumes that a fraction 6 of those working
positive hours report the stereotypical number n while the rest report
the truth. When conservatively calibrated to the cross-section of 365
diary men, both models imply substantially larger elasticities (see the
middle four rows of Table 2). Details of these calculations can be found in
Appendix B.
A critical review of the literature on time measurement is beyond the
scope of this paper [see Juster (1986) for a favorable evaluation of diary
studies, and Juster and Stafford (1991) for a literature review], but there
may be other reasons to distrust time diaries, so my fourth method is
based on the CPS data only. It discards those men reporting exactly 40
weekly hours (roughly half of the sample) before computing cohort aver-
ages and estimating cross-cohort regressions. The method implicitly as-
sumes that all reporting 40 are liars and that the propensity to lie is
unrelated to determinants of labor supply other than the wage. Esti-
mates of 0.8 and 1.0 are found with this method for the 25-55 age group.
Correcting wages in addition to hours increases estimates in the first six
rows of the table, but this is not true with the fourth method.
3.6 OLDER WORKERS I: SOURCES OF WAGE VARIATION
It appears from the pretax wage series in Figure 2 and is obvious from
the tax measures shown in Figure 3 that there is more age-related varia-
tion in the after-tax market value of time when older workers are in-
cluded in the sample. All else the same, more variation in the after-tax
market value of time might be expected to minimize underestimation of
or due to measurement and other errors. Because labor supply may not
be as linear as suggested by my equation (10), it may also be desirable—
from the point of view of making predictions for aggregate labor




However, including older workers may increase the difficulty of infer-
ring an age group's average market value of time, because relatively few
work some time during the year (although see my discussion in the next
subsection). Panel data complement the cross-section data in my Section
3.7 to make some progress on this problem.
32. The average annual hours worked for those aged 24 and over in the 1975-1976 Diary
Study (including women) is 1165, which can be compared with 2047 for men aged 25-
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Another problem is that older workers are more likely to hold part-
time jobs for "noneconomic" reasons, and thus part-time jobs may pay
less than full-time jobs (author's calculations from the March 1977 CPS).
If the old-age movement to part-time jobs is in response to the declining
labor productivity growth that occurs with age, my measures of wages
overstate the declining rate of growth and may understate a. However,
an old-age movement to part-time employment may be in response to an
exogenous change in preferences for work, so that the decline in wages
is a response to a decline in labor supply (not the other way around) and
cr is overestimated. One adjustment for this is to estimate the age-group
average pretax market value of time from a sample of full-time workers
only. Doing so produces estimates of cr which are very similar to those
displayed in Tables 1-3, suggesting that these two biases are nearly
offsetting.
3
3 It should be noted, however, that even the average hourly
earnings of full-time workers in their sixties are as low as or lower than
those of full-time workers aged 30.
3.7 COMPOSITION BIAS OVER THE LIFE CYCLE
Because employment rates vary with age, the average hourly earnings
of a cohort's workers is an average over a sample that varies with age.
In contrast, the implications of the theory have been derived for a
sample which (ignoring mortality) is constant over time—the entire
cohort. To the extent that the market value of time differs for employ-
ees and nonemployees, the average log hourly earnings of cohort a's
workers, X*"t, is a biased estimate of the average log market value of
time of the entire cohort, X
at. I refer to this bias as a composition bias and
denote it by B
at:
composition bias? = In B
at = (1 - 17?) (X*? - X
at),
where X"t is the average log market value of time of those aged a who
don't work at t. The composition-bias corrections are done separately for
young and old men (age^55 and age>55). For young men, PSID waves
1976-1978 (referring to hours and earnings for 1975-1977) are used to
correct for the composition bias arising when the average hourly earn-
ings of workers in 1976 are used to estimate the value of time of all
33. Full-time wage results—including those that make OJT, tax, composition bias, and
hours reporting bias corrections and include workers as old as 79—are available upon
request. Of course, these calculations do not rule out the possibility that the decline in
the taste for work mainly reduces wages of full-time workers rather than increasing the
propensity to take low-wage part-time jobs. It is also possible that full-time wage
estimates understate cr because the movement to part-time employment is part of the
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cohort members. Both PSID-SRC and SEO samples are used, but, by
weighting each man with his 1976 family weight, SEO members are
effectively downweighted for the purpose of computing various sample
average log wages.
At the annual level of time aggregation, transitions to and from em-
ployment are often associated with changes in household status. For
example, a young man is likely to form his own household when he goes
from a full year of no employment to a year of some employment. I
therefore utilize the individual files from the PSID (in addition to the
family files), because the individual files include information about
hours and incomes of men who are not heads of households. The indi-
vidual files report an individual's taxable income and indicate whether
that income includes any nonlabor income, but not how much. This is
the only measure of labor income available for PSID men who are not
heads of households, but, not surprisingly, taxable income includes as-
set income only for 2% of these men.
3
4 I therefore exclude those
nonheads with asset income from my calculations of average log hourly
earnings.
In order to estimate the average value of time of nonworkers, some
assumptions are required. I assume that, conditional on age, the annual
growth rate of a person's market value of time is uncorrelated with
changes in his employment status. This assumption is true under the
null hypothesis of a zero labor-supply elasticity and can be true with a
nonzero elasticity, but is false under other conditions. If those who
change employment status have a different growth rate of their market
value of time, then my estimates of the composition bias are subject to a
selection bias. There is no magic correction for selection bias, so I only
note that it may be a problem and also point out that nearly every other
study of labor supply—including those individual-panel studies of the
hours margin in isolation from the employment margin [see my discus-
sion of assumption (A2) in Section 2.9]—has this kind of selection bias.
The selection bias arises in so many studies of labor supply because there
is no person who works continuously—even the hardest-working man
has some time when he is not working (e.g., evenings, weekends, sick
days, holidays, vacations)—and the econometrician is typically unable
to directly measure the market value of time during those nonwork
periods.
34. Based on comparisons of individual taxable income, individual transfer income, and
household-head labor income for men who are heads of households and report no
asset income, it is clear that "taxable income" excludes transfer income even though
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3.7.1 Young Men Over a three-year period, enough young men (95%)
are employed at some time that we can obtain a reasonable estimate of
the market value of time of those not employed in any particular year by
looking at the earnings of those men in adjacent years. First, I compute
the (t—l,t) and (t,t+l) average log hourly earnings growth for those
employed at least 200 hours in each of the two relevant years. For those
not employed at t but employed in an adjacent year, I estimate their
market value of time at t by adding (or subtracting) the relevant growth
rate to (or from) their average log hourly earnings when they were
working at t—1 or t+1.
35
Since employment rates are much greater than 50% for all young age
groups, one might expect that the relative market value of time of those
not employed is decreasing in the employment rate because those not
employed are a more select sample in the high-employment age groups.
In fact, the data—together with the estimation method outlined above—
support this.
It is too much to use the relatively few available PSID observations to
estimate the market value of time of those not employed as a function of
age, so I compute instead the mean percentage difference between a
nonworker's market value of time and the average value of time of
workers his age—a 20% (in log points) difference in my sample.
3
6 Bils
(1985) obtains a similar estimate of 20% for young men from the NLSY.
Assuming that the 20% gap is independent of age, the percentage com-
position bias of my CPS value of time estimates is
In B? = (1 - ni) 0.20, (12)
where 17" is the fraction of cohort a employed at some time during year t.
If instead the relative market value of time of those not employed is
decreasing in age (as the PSID data suggest), then my calculation (12)
overstates the correlation between composition bias and employment
rates, and I overstate the growth of the market value of time with age
among young men. This error tends to reduce estimates of the labor-
supply elasticity.
3.7.2 Old Men The annual employment status is much more persistent
for old men, because it is typical for a man to retire and never return to
employment again. One therefore might compute the composition bias
for old men by accumulating the composition bias. However, this accu-
35. For those working in both adjacent years, I average the results of the two methods.
36. The median difference is 11%.108 • MULLIGAN
mulation requires many years of a panel data set large enough to esti-
mate age-specific employment rates and retirement hazards for each
cohort. Assuming that B
at_x= B"",
1 the composition bias can be computed
according to
Bt - (A , - gt) - At_! + B, , age > bb
The first term is the (log of) date-(f-l) hourly earnings averaged across
those working at t, which is decomposed in the parentheses into the
date-f hourly earnings minus the growth rate between f—1 and t. The
second term is estimated (log of) date-(f-l) hourly earnings for those
working at t—1. The third term is an estimate of the lagged bias, which
differs from the actual lagged bias to the extent that retirement rates
were different for the a and a—I cohorts. Hence, the first two terms are
the increment to the composition bias.
Another relevant complication for old men is that some of them change
from full-time to part-time work and the part-time work tends to have
lower hourly earnings. As discussed above, an important part of the
difference between part-time and full-time wages by the elderly is the
form in which they pay the implicit social security tax, so I do not want to
count the retirement of a full-time worker as the exit of a relatively high-
wage person unless his wage is higher than that of other high-wage
workers. Yet another complication is that workers may receive a bonus,
accumulated sick pay, or other extra earnings upon retirement that can-
not be attributed to the work they did during the year prior to retirement.
This would also make it appear that high-wage men are more likely to
retire. Using the 1980 5% Census PUMS, I therefore compute the incre-
ment to the composition bias by imputing wages for sample men aged 55
and over according to the median average hourly earnings for full-time
male workers aged 50-54 in the same schooling and two-digit occupation
category, and then, cohort by cohort, comparing the log imputed wage
for those retiring and those remaining in the labor force.
3
7 Those who con-
tinue to work typically earn 8% per hour more than those retiring in co-
horts and 55-59, 4% more than those retiring in cohorts aged 60-69, and
6% more than those retiring in cohorts aged 70-79. In other words, low-
wage men are more likely to retire, especially before age 60. This finding
is consistent with the fact that social security rules encourage retirement
most for low-earnings people and with the patterns of retirement by
occupation and schooling documented by Costa (1998) and others.
37. The 1980 PUMS is used so as to have enough observations in each age-labor-force
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Although the wage gap between workers and recent retirees is largest
for cohorts aged 55-60, the increment to the composition bias is larger
for cohorts aged 60 and over because the retirement hazard is so much
larger. Figure 2 displays as crosses the age-wage profile corrected for
OJT and composition biases. We see that correcting for composition bias
lowers the estimated cohort market value of time (compare the crosses
with the squares), especially for young and old men. Table 3 reports
corresponding estimates of a and, when compared with Tables 1 and 2,
shows that correcting for composition bias in the aged-24-64 sample
typically lowers estimates of a, although the effect is quite small relative
to the other adjustments I've made. Although not reported in the tables,
the same is true for my estimates for the aged-25-55 and aged-24-79
samples.
3.8 OLDER WORKERS II: HEALTH AS AN INDEPENDENT
DETERMINANT OF LABOR SUPPLY
Aging is associated with changes in physical capabilities, especially at
older ages. Some of these changes affect labor productivity and, presum-
ing my various measures of the market value of time are related to labor
productivity, are useful sources of life-cycle wage variation. But aging
may also affect the marginal disutility of work. Without a proxy for the
marginal disutility of work, my basic labor-supply specifications attri-
bute all of the age-related labor-supply changes (apart from a trend) to
age-related wage changes.
I introduce several proxies for the marginal disutility of work in the
specifications that include older men. One proxy is annual hours spent
on personal care: dressing, bathing, toilet, trips to the doctor, helping
another adult with personal care, sleeping, and napping. There are two
reasons why one might expect this to be a good proxy for the marginal
disutility of work. First, a sick and frail person who must spent extra
time on these activities effectively has a shorter day to divide between
work and leisure. Second, one might expect age-related changes in
personal-care time to be correlated with other factors shifting the mar-
ginal disutility of work.
Men spend a substantial amount of time on personal care: 8 minutes per
week on medical appointments, 268 minutes per week washing and dress-
ing, 59 minutes per week on medical care for oneself or another adult, 2
minutes per week on other personal care, and 3455 minutes per week
sleeping or napping.
3
8 The sum of these personal-care minutes is corre-
lated with age, although the only subcategories with some positive correla-
38. These are averages for men aged 24-79.110 • MULLIGAN
tion are medical appointments, night sleep, and resting or napping (medi-
cal care for other adults is slightly negatively correlated with age).
I use four measures of physical capabilities from wave I of the Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS) and the survey of Assets and Health Dy-
namics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) to proxy for health status, although
it is unfortunate that these health surveys occurred 15 years after my
CPS and diary surveys were conducted.
3
9 Physical incapacities are likely
to be associated with pain experienced during work activities and would
thus be a reason why an older person might not work even if he were as
productive as when young. Physical incapacity measures are also ex-
pected to be correlated with other determinants of the marginal disutility
of work.
The first measure of physical (in)capabilities is the fraction of cohort
affirmative answers to three questions:
4
0
7s it very difficult or impossible for you to . . .
(i) . . .walkseveral blocks?
(ii) . . . climb a flight of stairs without resting?
(Hi) . . . lift or carry weights over 10 pounds, like a heavy bag of groceries?
My second measure is the fraction of the cohort often troubled with pain
that makes normal work difficult.
4
1 The third measure is the fraction of
the cohort that had been an overnight patient in a hospital during the
year prior to the interview.
4
2 The fourth is the body mass index [BMI =
(weight in kilograms)/(height in meters)
2], which has been shown to be
closely related to mortality, health, and labor-force participation [see
Costa (1998, Chapter 4) for a review of the relevant literature]. Age-
group average BMI and age-group average squared BMI are included in
the cross-age-group regressions.
It is perhaps unsurprising that the inclusion of health measures does
not substantially affect elasticity estimates, especially in the 24-64 age
group. After all, health deteriorated relatively rapidly with age in the
early part of the twentieth century, while gainful employment rates did
39. Neither HRS nor AHEAD surveyed many men aged 50 or less, so I assign all cohorts
aged 24-50 the values of the health variables for the 51-52-year-old cohort.
40. Those respondents who say they cannot answer the question because they do not do
the activity are assumed to be unable to do it.
41. AHEAD asks a slightly different question—whether pain "kept you from doing things
you wanted to do" during the last 12 months. For the age groups that appear in both
HRS and AHEAD, affirmative response rates to the AHEAD question are twice as
high, so I cut AHEAD responses in half to make them comparable with HRS.
42. The HRS also includes measures of cognitive ability such as memory skills. I exclude
these measures under the assumption that they are related to labor productivity but
not to the marginal disutility of work.Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 111
not (Costa, 1998, Chapters 2, 4). For example, Costa (1998, Figure 2.3)
reports gainful-employment rates of over 80% for white men aged 65
and over in 1880, 1900,1910, and 1920 (as compared with 20 or 25% for
the 1970s). At the same time she reports sizable majorities of veterans
aged 65 and over in 1910 suffering from chronic musculoskeletal (67.7%),
chronic digestive (84.0%), and chronic circulatory (90.1%) conditions
and compares them with much lower rates for World War II veterans
aged 65 and over in 1983 (47.2% with chronic musculoskeletal, 48.9%
with chronic digestive, and 39.9% with chronic circulatory conditions).
Costa also displays data from 1930 and 1992 showing a much steeper
1930 age gradient for risks of heart disease, arteriosclerosis, hyperten-
sion, and other chronic conditions. With an age-health gradient that is
so small by historical standards, health probably should not explain
much of the modern age-employment pattern. Furthermore, my mea-
sures of physical incapacity are not very high (e.g., only 13% of those
aged 65 report that pain prevents them from working) and follow a
pretty linear trend with age.
The only case in which the health variables make a substantial differ-
ence for the 24-64 group is when cohort hours are measured with the
time diary. But this may be spurious, because diaries constrain that all
uses of time—including the LHS variable (work hours) and one of the
RHS variables (personal-care hours)—sum to 24 hours per day. So the
final column of Table 3 reports wage elasticities from regressions includ-
ing measures of physical incapacity but not personal-care hours.
While modern changes in health with age may not produce dramatic
changes in the marginal disutility of work, this is not to say that health
does not explain a lot of life-cycle labor supply through its effect on the
wage. Pretax wages grow much less rapidly and even fall with age,
which partly reflects some declining physical capacity with age and
partly reflects human-capital investment decisions made in response to
that declining physical capacity. Bartel and Taubman's (1979) study of
four health conditions finds that, among those working during the year,
adverse health reduces pretax wages twice as much as it reduces hours,
and presumably some of this reduction in hours is a response to the
wage. The U.S. House Ways and Means Committee (1996, Section 1, p.
5), Diamond and Mirlees (1978), and others suggest that even the im-
plicit tax disincentives of the social security system are a response to the
age-health relationship.
3.9 WITHIN-COHORT AGGREGATION BIAS
I estimate equation (10) by regressing log cohort average hours on age
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tion bias A% a function of the second and higher moments of the within-
cohort distribution of et and In wt, is an omitted variable in this regres-
sion. One check for the presence of an omitted-variable bias is to use log
average after-tax market value of time as an independent variable. Doing
so has little effect on estimates of a (results available upon request) with
the exception of the aged 24-79 CPS sample and, to a much lesser
degree, the aged 24-64 CPS sample (see the third column of Table 3). An
aggregation bias term is still an omitted variable, but may be weakly or
even negatively correlated with A"t, so the similarity of results with aver-
age log wage and with log average wage suggests that aggregation bias
is not serious.
Nor is it clear that purging aggregation bias from estimates of a is
especially interesting for macroeconomic forecasting. Shocks affecting
the market value of time may also affect the distribution of e, and In wt
and do so in a way that is correlated with wt in much the same way it is in
life-cycle data.
3.10 OVERVIEW OF RESULTS FROM
SYNTHETIC-COHORT SAMPLES
Life-cycle data are consistent with a substantial willingness to substitute
leisure over time. Hours worked by a cohort grow almost twice as fast
relative to trend as that cohort's average after-tax market value of time.
An important—but not the only—component of the cohort's labor-
supply response is due to changes in its annual employment rate, while
many previous studies of similar life-cycle data focus only on employee
hours. Moreover, time-diary data suggest that the life-cycle changes in
aggregate work hours are understated by CPS-type surveys. Training
data suggest that life-cycle changes in the market value of time are over-
stated by CPS average hourly earnings. Another departure from previ-
ous studies is my consideration of behavior after age 60 or 65. Tables 1-3
review the six modifications I have made to life-cycle-based calculations
of the IES. Using a sample of prime-aged working CPS males, I arrive at
an estimate of 0.37 that is similar to that of Ghez and Becker (1975).
Expanding the sample to include all prime-aged men increases the esti-
mate to 0.57. Modifying this estimate by introducing older workers deliv-
ers estimates of 1.5 or higher. Instead, an elasticity of 1.36 is the result
when aggregate labor supply is considered with time-diary data. If the
time diaries are correct, young men slightly underreport and retirement-
aged men substantially overreport annual hours in CPS-type surveys.
Larger elasticity estimates are found even with CPS data when either a
correction for self-financed on-the-job training or a correction for life-
cycle changes in the marginal tax rate is made. Slightly smaller estimatesAnother Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 113
are obtained after a correction for composition bias and an introduction
of health regressors. The result of making all seven modifications—
considering aggregate cohort labor supply, adding older workers, correct-
ing for life-cycle changes in the marginal tax rate and training time, using
diary data, and correcting for composition bias—produces elasticity esti-
mates of 1 or 2. Even if one is dubious about some of my departures from
previous studies of life-cycle data, it seems difficult to argue that the life-
cycle data offer a powerful rejection of the ISH.
4. A Life Event: The Termination ofAFDC Benefits
4.1 OVERVIEW AND COMPARISON WITH
SYNTHETIC-COHORT SAMPLES
Clearly the value of time grows at different rates at different points of the
life cycle. It is also clear that labor supply grows at different rates over
the life cycle. But the discussion and analysis above shows that it is
difficult to quantitatively determine how anticipated wage growth
changes with age and to what degree labor supply responds to these
changes as well as changes in the willingness to work. As an attempt to
get better measures of anticipated changes in the value of time and
corresponding changes in labor supply—changes which cannot be attrib-
uted to changes in the willingness to work or other unobservables—I
look at a special life-cycle event, the termination of AFDC benefits at the
18th birthday of the youngest child.
4.2 TERMINATION OF AFDC AS A LIFE-CYCLE EVENT
For three reasons, the termination of AFDC benefits on the 18th birthday
of the youngest child is an interesting life-cycle event. First, it is fully
anticipated. Children can only get older or die, either of which eventually
terminates AFDC benefits. Furthermore, since policy for the period
1970-1995 had been rather stable over time regarding the age at which
benefits are terminated,
4
3 it is only reasonable for most of this period for
families with youngest child aged 17 to anticipate termination of bene-
fits. Since benefits are reduced to zero on the 18th birthday of the youn-
gest child, the magnitude of the benefit reduction that a family with
youngest child aged 17 might expect is easy for them to calculate: a
reduction from current benefit levels to zero.
43. It can be argued that the 1996 "welfare reform" introduced substantial uncertainty
about a particular family's future welfare eligibility. During the prior 25 years, the most
important legislative changes were in 1981, changes which affected to some degree the
magnitude of the AFDC tax on work (U.S. House Ways and Means Committee 1996,
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Second, because AFDC benefits act as an implicit tax on the earnings
of AFDC household heads, the event produces a quantitatively impor-
tant change in the value of time. To a good approximation, AFDC and
food-stamp benefits bt for an eligible family at date t can be computed
according to equation (2) with bt = 0, and bt a function of calendar time,
family size, state of residence, and other demographic variables. In the
language of the House Ways and Means Committee, dt are "expenses
reasonably attributable to the earning of income" (including child-care
costs, transportation costs, and payroll taxes) and "earnings disregards"
and other deductions.
4
4 Rt is the "benefit reduction rate," approximately
equal to 0.5 for the years 1970-1995. The benefit formula (2) thereby acts
as a significant tax on work for pay, and represents a change in the value




If a work session were very short relative to the AFDC accounting
period (one month) and the constraint dt ^ wtnt did not bind, then labor
supply might be viewed as perfectly divisible and the tax rate on an
additional hour of work for otherwise eligible families would be Rt(t) [see
Barro and Sahasakul (1983) for a proof]. However, if participation in the
labor force during an AFDC accounting period requires a discrete in-
crease in hours, then the implicit tax rate rtM on participation is less than
Rtk and—to the extent that the length of a work session is similar to the




While the change in the market value of time is large and anticipated,
one disadvantage of a study of AFDC is that the magnitude of the
change is difficult to compute exactly. An exact calculation requires infor-
mation about earnings disregards, the costs of obtaining those disre-
gards, the degree to which work is indivisible, tastes, the pretax market
value of time, and other determinants of family eligibility. However,
equation (5) shows that the benefit reduction rate is an upper bound on
this implicit tax rate. Zero is a lower bound and applies to families whose
family structure, asset holdings, or other characteristic makes them ineli-
gible. The implicit tax rate is close to zero for a family with a high pretax
market value of time.
44. U.S. House Ways and Means Committee (1996, Section 8, p. 390). This section also pro-
vides a discussion of the rules concerning deductions and how they changed over time.
45. Computing the implicit tax on work may be a difficult task (for an economist or for a
welfare participant), but, since the families in my sample have youngest child aged 17,
it is reasonable to expect that their experience with the welfare system will cause them
to act as if they had pretty accurate estimates of the tax.
46. This formula ignores the effect of AFDC labor supply on asset holdings, which in turn
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Many studies of labor supply face the problem of estimating a per-
son's market value of time when he or she is not working. A third
advantage of studying the termination of AFDC is that we can plausibly
argue that the change in the value of time associated with the termina-
tion of benefits dominates other changes over the relatively short section
of the life cycle being studied. I argue that, while government policy
produces an important change in the value of time, the 18th birthday of
the youngest child is not associated with large and rapid changes in
tastes, health, productivity, and other variables. However, it turns out
that one disadvantage of this episode is that changes over time in the
implicit tax rate cannot be calculated precisely.
Another disadvantage of my AFDC study is that I do not have OJT or
diary hours measures. Indeed, hours reporting bias may be especially
systematic before the termination of AFDC, since AFDC beneficiaries
have an incentive to underreport their earnings (and hence their hours)
to government agencies—although they may not have the same incen-
tive to misreport to the PSID. If such PSID misreporting does occur, then
I am likely to underestimate hours before age 18 and overestimate a.
4.3 DATA DESCRIPTION AND TABULATION
Using the 1970-1990 waves of the PSID and including both the PSID-
SRC and SEO samples, I extract all households with youngest child aged
17 and a wife or female head present. I add to these records information
on the employment and family situation as well as some consumption
expenditures of the wife or female household head two years earlier
(when the child was 15) and two years later (when the child was 19).
This main sample can be divided into two:
AFDC sample. AFDC income > 0 in calendar year of the interview
when the youngest child was aged 17.
Non-AFDC sample. AFDC income = 0 in calendar year of the interview
when the youngest child was aged 17.
If the 18th birthday of the youngest child is not associated with large
and rapid changes in tastes, health, productivity, and other variables,
then we expect little change in the employment of non-AFDC women
whose youngest child turns 18. Column (1) of Table 4 verifies this conjec-
ture, snowing a slight decrease in the fraction of women employed
sometime during the year as their youngest child ages from 15 to 19.
Perhaps this decrease is to be expected given that the women in the
sample are typically in their forties and fifties and labor-force participa-
tion rates of women are declining slightly in this range [Sweet (1973,116 • MULLIGAN
Table 4 WOMEN'S MARKET WORK AS A FUNCTION OF AGE OF
YOUNGEST CHILD"
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fract. hours >0 at age 15
Fract. hours >0 at age 19
Annual hours, 15
Annual hours, 19
Log diff. annual hours
Annual h of workers, 15
Annual h of workers, 19
Log diff. ann. h of
workers
Ann. h of continuous, 15
b
Ann. h of continuous, 19
b




































































All Female Fern, hd., Fern, hd.,
head (AFDC 19) (AFDC 19)
=0 =0,
hd. age<62
79 65 53 46
Source: Author's calculation using the PSID.
"Annual measures of mother's market work according to the age of the youngest child.
ftHours of mothers employed sometime during both of the years when the youngest was aged 15 or 19.
Table 1-4) and the author's own calculations using the 1981-1991 CPS
outgoing rotation groups]. Conditional on working, annual hours
worked for non-AFDC increase slightly.
Column (2) of Table 4 reports the fraction of women in the AFDC
sample who were employed when the youngest child was 15 and the
fraction of the same women who were employed four years later when
the youngest child was 19. We see that the fraction working positive
hours increases from 0.30 to 0.33. Considering that many of the families
were not eligible for AFDC when the child was aged 15, the percentage
change in the annual hours worked by this group is a substantial 0.19 log
points. If we exclude the 14 male-headed AFDC households, the fraction
increases from 0.28 to 0.34 and annual hours increase by 26%.Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 117
A few of the 65 age-17 female-headed AFDC households—12 to be
exact—still receive AFDC payments after the youngest child turns 18.
For all of these 12, a younger child entered the household and may be
the reason for continued AFDC eligibility. If we exclude those house-
holds who do not appear to have eligibility terminated, the fraction
working increases from 0.32 to 0.38 and annual hours increase by 24%.
Seven of the female household heads are old enough to be eligible for
social security, although it is not clear that all of them would have had
long enough work histories to be eligible. For those who do collect social
security after their youngest child turns 18, the change in the incentives
to work is different from those who do not. One way to separate the
effect of social security is to delete all households with heads aged 62 or
more when the child was 19. For those in this sample who have their
AFDC eligibility terminated, annual hours increase 37%.
"Annual hours" reported in the third and fourth rows is an average
across the same sample of women at two points in time, with women who
do not work at all (who are 60-70% of the AFDC sample) counted as zeros.
What about hours among those who do some work during the year? This
is equal to annual hours of all divided by the fraction with positive hours
and is reported in the sixth and seventh rows of Table 4. "Hours of work-
ers" increase substantially in the AFDC sample, about as much as the
fractions working some hours. Notice from the first two rows of the table
that "hours of workers" is an average over two different samples at the
two points in time, because the fraction of those working positive hours is
different. Another interesting statistic is hours worked by those working
in both years (annual hours of continuous workers), a statistic which is
necessarily computed over the same sample at both points in time. We see
even larger increases here, and it can be inferred from the table that those
entering the labor force between ages 15 and 19 (i.e., those who have zero
hours at 15 and positive hours at 19) work fewer hours than those who
were already in the labor force and remain there.
Notice that, after the termination of benefits, the annual hours of con-
tinuous workers are quite similar to those of women in the non-AFDC
sample. However, the annual hours and the fractions with positive an-
nual hours in the AFDC and non-AFDC groups are still fairly different.
Thus, although the termination of benefits has a substantial effect on
work, it is clear that AFDC eligibility cannot explain all of the difference
between the employment of the AFDC and non-AFDC samples.
4.4 TAX RATE AND ELASTICITY ESTIMATES
What do we learn about willingness to substitute work over time from
this life-cycle event? An estimated intertemporal elasticity of substitu-118 • MULLIGAN
tion of work is one summary of the data which is comparable with other
intertemporal studies of wage and work changes. This first requires an
estimate of the change in the sample average implicit tax rate on work. I
consider three estimates of the sample average T before age 18: 0.2, 0.3,
and 0.4.
At the micro level, the implicit tax rate T is zero for families who are
ineligible regardless of mother's earnings and can be bounded above by
the benefit reduction rate (including the food-stamp program, 0.47 be-
fore 1981 and somewhat larger after) for otherwise eligible families. Even
conditional on nonearnings determinants of eligibility, it is difficult to
compute the implicit tax rate, because the tax on earnings is nonlinear, is
determined by both AFDC and food-stamp rules, depends on earnings-
related deductions and how they interact with other determinants of
eligibility, depends on the costs of obtaining various deductions and
earnings disregards, depends on the pretax market value of time and the
degree to which work is indivisible, and changes with calendar time.
Fraker, Moffitt, and Wolf (1985) compute average tax rates of 0.25 in
1971,0.32 in 1979, and 0.70 in 1982, and even these are too high, because
they ignore the costs of obtaining various deductions [shown as / in
equation (5)]. Thus I view 0.5 as a conservative upper bound on the
implicit tax rate r for families satisfying eligibility requirements other
than mother's earnings.
In order to compute a sample-average T, we must compute the fraction
of families satisfying eligibility requirements other than mother's earn-
ings. We know that a family in my AFDC sample is eligible (or at least
appears eligible to the welfare agency) when the youngest child is aged
17, because they receive AFDC income in that year. We also know that
the 53 families in columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 are ineligible when the
child is aged 19. What we do not know is exactly how many families are
eligible when the child is aged 15. However, studies of AFDC mobility
surveyed by the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee (1995, pp.
500-510) suggest that an important fraction—perhaps as much as one-
half
47—of those receiving AFDC at child age 17 would not be eligible at
child age 15 because of changes in eligibility other than high earnings at
that age. If so, then the sample-average age-15 implicit tax rate could
eaisly be as small as 0.2. Thus I view 0.4 as a conservative upper bound
on the sample-average T.
Second, as shown in my model, we need to say something about the
shape of the distribution of unobserved determinants of participation in
47. 80% of the sample of 46 families in column (5) receive AFDC sometime during the
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order to say something about how a, say, 50% wage change would affect
participation rates in a group with a participation rate of 25% vs. a group
with a rate of 75%. We make two assumptions in this regard—normal
and uniform distributions. Then the estimated elasticity of participation
is the percentage change in G"
1 (J7() (where TIt is the participation at
child's age t) divided by the percentage change in the value of time (In
0.6, In 0.7, or In 0.8). Table 5 reports elasticity estimates for a variety of
work and tax rate estimates. An elasticity of 1 is fairly typical.
It is well known that AFDC participation involves movement into and
out of the labor force [see the studies surveyed by the U.S. House Ways
and Means Committee (1996)], and this fact alone strongly suggests that
at least some people are willing to substitute work over time. It may even
be the case that people select into the AFDC program on the basis of
their willingness to substitute over time (a) as well as income, tastes, and
other variables. If so, then the elasticity estimates reported in Table 5 are
not indicative of a typical person's willingness to substitute leisure over
time, with the deviation determined by the importance of a relative to
income, tastes, and other variables.
AFDC is most relevant for women workers, and women may have a
different willingness to substitute leisure over time [Mulligan (1995),
for example, estimates larger </s using synthetic cohorts of women].
One potential reason for a difference between women and men is that
the woman is often the "secondary" and the man the "primary" house-
hold worker in a two-worker household. The bearing of children may
Table 5 INTERTEMPORAL ELASTICITY ESTIMATES
Fract. of full-year work at age 15"






















































"AFDC sample average annual hours divided by 2080.
'See text for computation.120 • MULLIGAN
be another source of differences. But neither of these differences is
especially relevant for our AFDC sample, because 65 of the 79 AFDC
households are headed by women and the youngest child for these
women is 17.
Even if the AFDC sample were special with respect to willingness to
substitute over time, this select sample might be especially interesting
for business-cycle and other applications where the workers whose
labor supply is changing over time may also be a select sample with
respect to a.
4.5 SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS
AFDC eligibility depends on employment status, so my AFDC sample is
a select sample in two ways. First, as can be seen from the age-19
employment variables for the AFDC and non-AFDC samples, the AFDC
sample selects adults whose lifetime propensity to work is low. Second,
to the extent that the propensity to work varies over time in ways
unrelated to the AFDC benefit formulae, my AFDC sample selects par-
ents who happened to have a low propensity to work in the year their
youngest child was 17 years old. For this reason alone, employment and
earnings in the AFDC sample would tend to be higher during years the
child was not 17.
However, the selection bias with respect to willingness and ability to
work when the child was aged 17 is not particularly relevant to my
calculations unless it introduces a differential selection bias with respect
to ability and willingness to work at child ages 15 and 19. In an in-
tertemporally separable model, it seems that the selection biases should
be similar for aged-15 and aged-19 work measures.
This may not be the case if there is some willingness to substitute over
time and labor supply is not intertemporally separable. To the extent that
work (leisure) capital is accumulated by working (not working), the sam-
ple of adults not working much in the year prior to an anticipated in-
crease in the market value of time (i.e., when the child is aged 17) is a
sample of adults who, for one reason or another, do not anticipate work-
ing much following the increase. If instead, work (leisure) capital is
accumulated by not working (working) as in Kydland and Prescott
(1982), the sample of adults not working much in the year prior to an
anticipated increase in the market value of time is a sample of adults
who are "resting" in anticipation of an above-average amount of work in
the following year or two. Thus intertemporal nonseparabilities intro-
duce a differential selection bias on the aged-15 and aged-19 work vari-
ables, but without saying more about the form of the nonseparabilities,
the direction of the differential bias cannot be determined.Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 121
While the tastes or nonmarket value of time of a typical woman might
not change substantially at the 18th birthday of her youngest child, my
AFDC sample might—because of AFDC rules regarding marital status—
be one where tastes do change. Marriage decreases the likelihood of
AFDC eligibility (Rosenzweig, 1995), so my AFDC sample may select
women who, because of program incentives or for other reasons, are
more likely to get married after their youngest child's 18th birthday. If
marriage increases a woman's nonmarket value of time, then this is a





Since the termination of AFDC benefits at date t* is fully anticipated, it
cannot be a wealth or income effect in a model in which different peri-
ods' budget are somehow tied together. In such a model, the only deter-
minant of the relative labor supply before and after t* is the relative value
of time (including, if appropriate, time discounting) and the rate at
which resources can be transferred across periods.
If budgets for different periods were not tied together in any way—
perhaps because borrowing and lending involve a substantial fixed cost
or because individuals do not realize that such transactions are possible
and advantageous—then, despite its anticipation, the termination of
benefits would have an income effect as well as the usual substitution
effect. Both effects would tend to promote work after AFDC. One way to
test for this possibility is to see whether consumption falls at t*. Using
Skinner's (1987) proxy for nondurable consumption (a weighted average
of food purchased at home, food purchased away from home, and rent
or housing value), real family consumption decreases 8% ($250 a year, in
1967 dollars) from age 15 to 18 in the sample from column (5) of Table 4
with valid consumption indicators. Annual family food consumption
(including food stamps) falls $100. Given that AFDC-ADC annual in-
come falls by an average of $1121, this decrease is economically insignifi-
cant. But it is a decrease, and it should be noted that a decline in
consumption together with an increase in work is not found in other life-
cycle studies (Ghez and Becker, 1975; Heckman, 1974).
There are two reasons why even a large reduction in consumption at t*
might be consistent with the dynamic labor-supply view. First, consump-
tion and leisure may not be separable. Second, consumption as I mea-
sure it is excessively sensitive to household size, since it measures rent
48. Note that there is not an income effect of marriage in the life-cycle model unless the
expectations of marriage by women in my sample deviate from the fraction of them
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and food expenditures. If, for example, part of the effect of AFDC were
to keep teenagers living at home until their benefits terminated, at which
time the teenager moved out, then household rent and food expendi-
tures would fall even though each individual's standard of living might
be unchanged. Unfortunatly, there are not enough households in my
AFDC sample with stable composition to test this second hypothesis.
5. Conclusions
Following Mulligan (1998), I build a model of labor-force participation
and time aggregation which, in reduced form, looks very much like the
empirical models used by Lucas and Rapping (1969), MaCurdy (1981),
and Altonji (1986). The model predicts that labor supply is substituted
over time in response to anticipated wage changes, although the magni-
tude of the response depends on the parameter a, which in theory can
vary from 0 to °°. The model is quite explicit about the measurement of
wages and hours, including the treatment of on-the-job training, time
spent searching for work, nonlinear tax rules, and the aggregation of
various components of labor supply.
It might be argued that people cannot substitute over time because
they are unable to choose their hours or because they cannot borrow or
lend as freely as the model implies. Although my model does include
the idea that people are less than free to choose their hours—labor is
indivisible—it is true that the present-value budget constraints (3) are
crucial for deriving the main empirical specifications. While the validity
of the assumptions of the theory is open to debate, I have shown that a
reasonable analysis of various age-related changes in wages and labor
supply confirms one main prediction of the theory—labor-supply
growth is positively correlated with anticipated wage growth.
In a broad sample of men, I find that age groups of men with 1% more
age-related growth in their after-tax market value of time have 1-2%
more age-related growth in group hours worked. This response is an
order of magnitude greater than those found in other life-cycle studies of
men. Equation (11) summarizes what I believe to be my essential depar-
tures from that literature: "labor supply" is defined to include the em-
ployment and all other margins, the market value of time is adjusted for
taxes, average hourly earnings are adjusted for self-financed OJT, and
CPS hours are adjusted for systematic reporting bias.
Because my inferences from the life-cycle data are so different from
those made in previous studies, I expose my empirical analysis through
a few simple graphs, difference estimators, and regressions. More effi-
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point of departure from previous studies is not in the econometric de-
tails but in the very basic economic and statistical issues which are argu-
ably of primary relevance to the problem.
Studies of individual-panel or synthetic-cohort data—mine included—
cannot do much about the fact that the market value of time when not
working is not observed. Someone who is not working at an instant in
time may have a market value of time that is low compared with his
average hourly earnings at some other point in time or with the average
hourly earnings of an otherwise similar person who is working at that
instant. My study of the termination of AFDC benefits upon the 18th
birthday of the youngest child is an attempt to mitigate this bias, since I
believe that the observable change in the after-tax market value of time
dominates any unobserved changes. IES estimates from this study are
quite similar to those found with the synthetic-cohort data.
Social security rules create another life-cycle event that, like the termi-
nation of AFDC benefits, is a quantitatively important anticipated
change in the after-tax market value of time. This event has been in-
cluded in my analysis of synthetic cohorts, although, for students of
intertemporal substitution, retirement is worthy of its own study. And
there have been a number of studies of the effects of social security rules
on retirement decisions, with a variety of results. Cross-country studies
(e.g., Gruber and Wise, 1997; Modigliani and Sterling, 1983) have typi-
cally enjoyed large and fairly obvious differences in benefit rules and
have found large differences in retirement. Some time-series studies
(e.g., Burtless, 1986; Hausman and Wise, 1985; Krueger and Pischke,
1992) have enjoyed less variation in benefit rules and found even smaller
labor-supply responses.
4
9 However, there are two disadvantages of so-
cial security rules as a source of an exogenous change in the anticipated
rate of wage growth. First, it is not at all clear that workers are fully
aware of all the subtleties of social security rules and their changes over
time, including those changes that are exploited by some of the time-
series studies. Second, it can be argued that social security rules and
their changes are less likely than other policies to be exogenous with
respect to the situation of the people affected by the policy. The Ameri-
can Association of Retired Persons (AARP) is America's most powerful
lobby (Birnbaum, 1997), and its preferences are certainly reflected in
social security legislation. The endogeneity of social security policy
might also explain the relatively large cross-country correlation between
labor supply and social security rules. Nevertheless, I eagerly await a
49. Several time-series studies also utilize unanticipated policy changes, which are less
relevant for the ISH.124 • MULLIGAN
study of retirement designed to measure the magnitude and importance
of intertemporal substitution and perhaps even to overcome some of the
disadvantages I've mentioned.
Another avenue for future life-cycle research may be to exploit some
of the differences in wage growth across occupation and schooling cate-
gories. However, doing so is a difficult exercise if the issues I emphasize
in this paper are important. It seems that the level and life-cycle rate of
change of OJT varies across occupation and schooling categories [al-
though no such variation can be detected in my fairly small data set—see
Stafford and Duncan (1985)], so that the more rapid average hourly
earnings growth in some categories cannot be fully attributed to more
rapid growth in the market value of time. Also, the currently available
time-diary data sets seem too small to correct for hours reporting biases
separately by occupation and schooling categories.
I study synthetic cohorts of men mainly because there is a greater
consensus in the previous literature about the lack of response of male
labor supply to temporary wage fluctuations. But macro data are an
aggregate of men and women, so a differential response by gender
would be one reason why my synthetic-cohort estimates might not di-
rectly apply to macro modeling. I do study women in Section 4 and
obtain similar estimates of a, but it is unclear whether the AFDC women
are more like the representative man or the representative woman. Like
men, the AFDC women are typically heads of household and might for
that reason have a lower a than the representative woman. On the other
hand, AFDC women are women. AFDC women might even have a
higher a than other women because a higher a makes AFDC participa-
tion more attractive.
There is another reason that caution should be exercised in the applica-
tion of my estimates to macro modeling. The OJT, reporting, composi-
tion, and other biases which are important in the life-cycle data may also
be present in the macro data. There is no easy solution to this, since the
biases may be of different magnitudes or even different signs in the two
sources, but one can try to similarly correct macro data or rely mainly on
earnings data (rather than hours and wage data) where we suspect some
of the biases to be less important.
Although the life-cycle data suggest that the temporal pattern of work
responds to the temporal pattern of the market value of time, the data do
not necessarily support the hypothesis that all or even most of the varia-
tion in work across workers or over time for a given worker can be
explained as a response to temporary wage fluctuations. In fact, my
model allows for a number of other potential determinants of work
through the indivisibility of labor as well as cross-sectional and in-Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 125
tertemporal variation in the taste parameter y. I only suggest that, if and
when temporary fluctuations in the after-tax market value of time occur,
aggregate labor supply will respond and respond in a quantitatively
important way. And, regardless of the number and importance of other
determinants of labor supply, my claim has important implications for
macroeconomics.
Appendix A: Notes on Social Security Benefits and Work
Incentives
Because social security benefits are a function of a worker's life history of
earnings and labor-force participation, they can affect incentives to work
at all ages. These incentives can be parsed into two categories: (1) the
effect of work on earnings and the primary insurance amount (PIA) that
will be used to compute benefits when retirement occurs, and (2) the
effect of participation and earnings at age 62 and older on the fraction of
the PIA to be received as a social security benefit. This appendix draws
heavily on the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee (1996, Section 1)
and Myers (1993, Chapter 2, 3).
A.I WORK BEFORE AGE 62 AND THE PIA
A person's PIA is a concave function of his lifetime average earnings
where each year's earnings is indexed to reflect nationwide wage growth
(with the exception of earnings after age 60, which are unindexed), the
average caps each year's earnings according to the payroll tax cap, and
the average drops the lowest-indexed-earnings years. The second provi-
sion means that no additional benefits accrue for men earning above the
cap. If the number of potential work sessions in a year (K) is small, the
last provision is particularly relevant for workers who participate most of
their lives, because the marginal participation decision has no affect on
PIA. To see this, notice that, unless the labor-supply trend term is very
different in magnitude from the rate of nationwide wage growth, the
marginal participation decision occurs in a year with low indexed earn-
ings conditional on working.
501 refer to this as the PIA fixed case.
If K is large, the marginal work session will typically affect computa-
tion of the PIA, and this is the case analyzed by Feldstein and Samwick
50. Even if the marginal participation decision did not occur in a low-indexed-earnings
year (conditional on working), nonparticipation would produce zero earnings, remove
the year from the average, and add another year to the average, so the effect of the
decision on the lifetime average would be limited to the difference between what might
have been earned in the year in question and what was earned in the best year not
included in the average.126 • MULLIGAN
(1992). For single men and for married men whose wives earn enough to
have substantial social security benefits, they use the following formula
to compute the effect of an additional dollar of earnings at age a on




The first factor reflects the use of 35 years to compute lifetime-average
indexed earnings (AIME). The second factor reflects the indexing, where
aR is the normal retirement age and a is age (Feldstein and Samwick
assume individual and national earnings growth of 1%/yr). PIA/AIME
depends on AIME; Feldstein and Samwick assume the median ratio of
0.32. r
II
T is the marginal individual income tax rate to be paid in the
retirement years, and S is the factor used to compute the discounted
expected value of an annuity that begins paying at age aR. Feldstein and
Samwick do their calculations for 1992 under the assumption that benefit
rules (aR, PIA/AIME, r
IIT) will never change from the values dictated by
current law. In fact, rules did change between 1976 and 1992 and proba-
bly will change again. Rather than making guesses about what each age
group in 1976 knew or expected about the policy and mortality parame-
ters, I use Feldstein and Samwick's parameters. I use their highest dis-
count rate of 6%/yr to reflect (1) expectations of the benefit cuts in one
form or another that so many experts and laymen have been forecasting
and (2) the associated political risk premium.
Feldstein and Samwick also perform calculations for married men
whose wives do not have substantial lifetime earnings. I do not review
their calculations here, but assume that roughly half of all men earning
below the cap expect to be in this category when they retire and there-
fore take a simple average of the formula above and the increment to
discounted expected benefits enjoyed by this second category of men.
In summary, my "PIA endogenous" calculations for men earning less
than the social security cap average the increment to discounted expected
benefits implied by Feldstein and Samwick's (1992) columns 2 and 4 of
their Table 1. This increment is subtracted from the 1976 payroll tax rate.
5
1
A.2 WORKERS AGED 62-71
The same PIA effects act as a subsidy to work for those 62 and over who
have not elected to begin receiving their social security benefits. I extend
51. Feldstein and Samwick (1992) report the increment in 5-year intervals, which I interpo-
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Feldstein and Samwick's calculations by adjusting their annuity factor
S(aR,a,r) for 6% interest as age nears 65 and, after age 65, for mortality as
indicated below. Those working after age 61 are also still liable for payroll
taxes.
In addition to the payroll taxes, two major provisions of social security
have discouraged work for pay by the elderly: earnings limits and de-
layed retirement credits. The earnings limit is the maximum earnings an
elderly worker can earn without losing some of his old-age benefits. The
limit does not apply to those aged 70 or higher. For earnings above this
amount ($2760 per year in 1976 for those aged 62-71), old-age benefits
are reduced (employment status does not and did not affect Medicare
eligibility, although since 1980 employment status can affect the health
insurance premiums paid by an elderly person (U.S. House Ways and
Means Committee, 1996, Section 3, p. 223)). The rate of reduction during
the 1970s was $1 for each $2 over the limit.
For those workers aged 62-71 who are receiving social security, I com-
pute the additional tax on work as 0 if he earns below the limit and 0.5 if
he earns at or above it. It is important to note that these men are typically
part-time workers earning a lower hourly pretax wage than they would
have earned if they had worked full time, so the use of their pretax wage
in my calculations in Section 3.2 already includes some of the disincen-
tive effects of social security.
For workers aged 72+, no additional tax or PI A subsidy is computed,
although the low hourly earnings of these men is to some degree a
consequence of social security's encouraging them to work fewer hours
in their sixties.
If a worker elects not to receive any old-age (or disability) benefits, he
is credited with some additional old-age benefits when he later retires.
These credits, called delayed retirement credits (DRC), are however small
enough (1%) that most people aged 65-71 were effectively penalized for
delaying retirement.
5
2 A person aged 65-71 of average health planning
to retire in 1976 lost over 90% of a year's benefits by delaying retirement
an additional year. However, only if K is small is this provision a marginal
tax on work.
For someone who first retired in 1976, it is straightforward to compute
the amount of these benefits, the implicit tax on nonretirement for that
52. Hurd and Boskin (1984) and others argue that the decision to retire at age 65 is not
distorted, because the delayed retirement credits are "actuarially fair." This may have
been true at the time of writing their paper for a person of average mortality risk, but
not before 1979 when the DRC was only 1% and before 1975 when there was no DRC
(U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, 1996, Section 1). The DRC for those aged 62-
64 was 8.4%, which I treat as actuarially fair.128 • MULLIGAN
year and (assuming K is small) the implicit marginal tax on work. How-
ever, too little is known about the earnings histories of CPS men who
have not yet retired to compute exactly the benefits they would enjoy if
they had retired in 1976. If these potential benefits were known, the
implicit tax on work (in addition to the IIT, payroll taxes, and the accumu-
lation of SS wealth considered previously) could be computed as
[0.92 + (a- 62)0.005]
 J
where bjei is person i's ratio of potential benefits to actual earnings. The
factor in brackets is greater than zero and a function of age, because the
delayed retirement credits were actuarially unfair.
5
3 I estimate the ratio
bj/ej as 0.4 for single men, which is a fairly typical replacement rate
reported by the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee (1996, Table 1-
14) for cohorts retired by 1976. The value 0.6 is used for married men
over 65, under the assumption that their retirement also entitles their
spouses to benefits equal to half of the amount of their own benefits.
Appendix B. Two Models of Reporting Errors
Two of my four corrections for CPS hours reporting bias rely on a model
of reporting errors. The first is a compression model (B-l) where each
worker reports hours that are closer to a stereotypical number n than are
his actual hours; the second is a liars model (B-2) where some apparently
random workers choose to report the stereotypical number n:
In n - In n = 0 (In n - In n), n> 0, (B-l)
fn w.p.l-fc
[ n w.p. 0,
 v '
where n is true hours and n is reported hours.
Remember that, by definition, aggregate labor supply is the product of
average hours conditional on positive hours and the fraction working
positive hours. In order to derive the effect on aggregate labor supply of
reporting bias among those reporting positive hours during some time
interval, we need to model both aggregate labor supply and the fraction
working positive hours (the employment rate). My life-cycle model pro-
53. Details of my derivation of the factor in brackets—which equals 1 - 0.0lS(aR,a,r)—are
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vides a quite tractable model of aggregate labor, but, unless K is known,
not a model of the employment rate. Even if K were known, my model of
the employment rate is not particularly tractable. So, as an approxima-
tion, I assume a log-linear model for true age-group hours averaged
across those with positive hours:
In n\ = r] In uft + u% n"t > 0, (B-3)
with tft the arithmetic mean of true hours among those with positive
hours, and uft the age-group geometric-average after-tax market value of
time. n"t is assumed to be uncorrelated across age groups with uft and
with the error term in equation (10). Total age-group hours N"t are still
determined according to equation (10). It is assumed that measured
average age-group hourly earnings vft differ from true average age-
group hourly earnings uft according to
vft = uftn
at/n"t. (B-4)
Up to an aggregation bias term, the compression model implies equa-
tion (B-l) for average reported age-group hours conditional on positive
hours (nf) as a function of average true age-group hours conditional on
positive hours (n"t). Given the compression factor 0, the reported hours
elasticity with respect to the measured wage TJ, and the R
2 of the
reported-hours equation, we can infer the true hours elasticity TJ from
equations (10), (B-l), (B-3), and (B-4):
5
4
0 0-(l-0)f, ^ \-i
while the elasticity of true hours with respect to the reported wage is
Given also the reported total-hours elasticity with respect to the mea-
sured wage a, we can infer the true total-hours elasticity a:
a = 17 + (a — if) rjd
e(i e)y) (i/R)
[1 + (1 - 0)rj\ri * — -(1 - 6)r)T)
' ' 6 - (1 - 0)f)
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The elasticity of true total hours with respect to the measured wage is a
- f) + T)/8. Similar calculations (not shown here) can be made for the
liars model.
Both the compression and the liars model have a parameter 6 which
can be calibrated by comparing reported hours in the CPS and the time
diaries. For example, the micro-level standard deviation of log hours is
twice as large in the diaries as in the CPS and (appropriately correcting
for the different sample sizes) the standard deviation across groups aged
25-55 is almost three times as large in the diaries. This suggests a com-
pression parameter of 6 = 0.4 or 6 = 0.5.1 use a conservative 6 = 0.7 for
the compression-model calculations reported in the text.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to build and formally test various
models of reporting errors, but I do comment on their "realism." Four
facts come out of an elementary comparison of the distribution of posi-
tive "hours last week" (or "usual hours last year") reported by men aged
25-55 from the March 1977 CPS with positive hours worked in the syn-
thetic week reported by men aged 25-55 from the 1975-76 time diaries.
First, close to 50% of CPS respondents report exactly 40 hours, and 75%
report working exactly 52 weeks in 1976, as compared to 19% of time-
diary synthetic weeks between 38.0 and 42.0 hours. When either CPS
measure of weekly hours is multiplied by weeks worked in 1976, about
40% report exactly 40 hours as 1976 average weekly hours. Second, the
standard deviation of log reported weekly hours is twice as large in the
time diary as in the CPS. Third, the fraction of CPS workers reporting
exactly 40 hours is very slightly increasing in age until age 63, after
which it is about half of what it is for younger workers, although the age-
group variance of log reported weekly hours increases steadily with age
in both the CPS and diary studies. Fourth, the central tendency of the
distribution of weekly diary hours is roughly 40 hours, with a majority of
synthetic weeks between 30 and 50 hours.
The first fact is more consistent with the liars model, since the compres-
sion model does not literally predict that many would report exactly 40
hours, although the compression model might be amended to account for
the first fact by introducing some rounding to the nearest integer. Both
models are consistent with the second fact. The third fact suggests that the
liars model is more appropriate up to age 63 and the compression model
after age 63, since the compression model predicts that a widening of the
distribution of true hours would decrease the fraction of CPS respondents
reporting hours within a given distance of 40. However, the fourth fact is
more easily derived from the compression model, since, in contrast to the
liars model, the stereotype is related to the distribution of misreported
hours even for those not reporting the stereotype.Another Look at Life-Cycle Labor Supply • 131
Notice that the liars model also justifies the procedure used to produce
results in the last two rows of Table 2 if we assume in addition that all of
those reporting 40 are liars. Actually, the procedure is justified even if
liars are not random with respect to their wage, as long as they are
random with respect to other determinants of hours.
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When I first read this paper, I wavered a bit from my historical posi-
tion that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is fairly low. But
my wavering did not last long. The paper has not moved me much in
the direction of elasticities over, say, 0.4. Still, I admire the brave
attempt.
Figure 1 shows the Mulligan staircase—the dramatic increase
achieved by correcting what seem to be flaws in the earlier literature
deriving from Ghez and Becker's first insight that age differences reveal
pure substitution effects. But the paper fails to come to grips with the
basic weakness of the Ghez-Becker approach—its reliance on a strong
and implausible identifying condition. That condition is that all age ef-
fects are linear in labor supply. Estimates of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution are found from comparing the departures from linear
growth in hours with departures from linear growth in wage rates.
Under the assumption that preferences can be related in a flexible way to
age, the elasticity is not identified.
To see this, consider a general specification of the disamenity of work-
ing L(T) hours at time T:
Z(T) dr





Adjust for social security
Hours from time diary
Add 56 to 64 year olds






rTzv(T)L(r) dr = present value of consumption less wealth.
/•
Here Z(T) is a weight applied to work in time T, a is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, r is the interest rate, and W(T) is the hourly





where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the wealth constraint.
In logs,
log L(T) = o-[log A - rr + log zv(r) — log Z(T)].136 • HALL
In general, if a and Z(T) are unknown parameters, they are not identi-
fied. Ghez and Becker made the strong identifying assumption
log Z(T) = a + J8T.
It is hard to see why this is compelling. In particular, it seems likely that
the disamenity of work rises sharply after age 60. Not only does this
violate the identifying assumption of linearity, but it coincides with the
most important variation in the data that pins down a. A plausible view
of retirement—in direct conflict with the identifying assumption—is
that the disamenity of work rises in the years after age 60.
The other big problem—one Mulligan flags repeatedly—is the lack of
identification resulting from sample selection issues. This is not an ar-
cane econometric issue, and the people who raise it should not be dis-
missed as perfectionists who stand in the way of practical research.
Sample selection becomes particularly acute when older people are
included in the sample. Ghez and Becker's restriction to preretirement
age groups can be defended as an attempt to limit the sample selection
problem.
Consider the following model: With probability TT(T), a worker suffers
a major decline in productivity because of a disabling medical condition
such as stroke or heart disease. The worker's wage drops below his
reservation level, and he withdraws from the labor force. Over the same
range, the wages earned by those workers who do not suffer the disabil-
ity decline slowly with age. Consider the example illustrated by Figure 2.
Mulligan's procedure will attribute the substantial declines in labor sup-
ply caused by the disability process to the small changes in wages of
participants. In the example, Mulligan's regression is
log NT = -107 + 44.61og w, + 0.0
So the estimated value of the elasticity is ridiculously high, 44.6. Large
biases can result from sample selection.
These two issues of identification are much more important in Mulli-
gan's work than in earlier work because of his extension into low-
participation, high-disability groups.
I like the work with AFDC recipients much better. There is no serious
identification problem either from general age-related preferences or
from sample selection. But there is little surprise value in the AFDC
results. The values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in Mulli-
gan's Table 5 are in line with earlier work on female labor supply and are
well below the surprising values of over 3 that Mulligan gets for men.Comment • 137
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The stated motivation for the research is macro interest in inter-
temporal substitution in labor supply, and, in any case, this is the Macro
Annual.
I've taken a pretty close look at the macro evidence in the light of
Mulligan's equation (1) and get reasonably sharp estimates of around
0.3, driven both by predictable variation in the real interest rate and in
wages. So, if Mulligan is right about micro cohort data, there is a prob-
lem reconciling his findings with macro behavior. There are enough
reasons to question the accuracy of the macro findings so that the recon-
ciliation could wind up favoring the micro view. But I'm far from con-
vinced after reading this paper, or the ingenious companion coming out
in the Journal of Political Economy.
Is the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution important for
macro? John Campbell's careful work suggests that no value of a deliv-
ers a reasonable story about employment fluctuations. One of the rea-
sons may be that the standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model has so much intertemporal substitution in produced
goods—through the timing of investment—that it makes little use of
intertemporal substitution in labor supply. People don't work harder
when goods are needed, because goods can be obtained by deferring
investment.138 • PISCHKE
In any case, Mulligan is pursuing an old issue at this point. The cur-
rent crop of DSGE models delivers employment fluctuations in a new
and more satisfactory way than intertemporal substitution in labor sup-
ply. These models consider a third use of time—job serach—and treat
recessions as periods when there are an unusually large number of peo-
ple searching. This seems more promising than the intertemporal substi-
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1. Introduction
Since the active research on intertemporal labor supply during the 1970s
and 1980s, things have been mostly quiet in this area. Various reviewers
have concluded that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for hours
is small for men, probably in the range from zero to one, and likely
below 0.5. Many of us have come to think that this assessment is un-
likely to change dramatically. When a central question has been laid to
rest, it is certainly useful when someone comes along every now and
then and stirs up some dust. Casey Mulligan does a remarkable job of
stirring in this paper, reporting elasticities as high as 6.5. This is particu-
larly noteworthy in that he focuses on variation in hours and wages over
the life cycle, an area where large elasticities have been especially hard to
find. Once the dust has settled, however, I suspect we will be back much
closer to the previous range. I will organize my comments around the
two empirical exercises in the paper: the estimates with synthetic-cohort
data and the termination of AFDC benefits.
2. Synthetic-Cohort Data
The intertemporal substitution hypothesis says that expected hours
should respond to expected, or evolutionary, changes in wages. One
reason for wages to move systematically, and clearly well known among
workers, is the tendency for wages to rise with age. This low-frequency
variation in hours should be of particular interest to macroeconomists: if
people are willing to substitute leisure over the phases of their life cycle,
they are likely to be willing to substitute over business-cycle frequencies
as well. Mulligan presents regressions of the logarithm of hours on theComment • 139
logarithm of wages by age group, an exercise which has been carried out
many times before. The paper discusses six potential adjustments to the
standard exercise. The main contribution is his attempt to put actual data
to use in estimating the effects of these adjustments. The six adjust-
ments are (1) including older workers in the estimation, (2) including
nonemployment as an hours choice, (3) using data from a time-diary
study as a potentially more accurate source of hours information, (4)
incorporating on-the-job training in the calculation of the hourly wage,
(5) allowing for taxes, and (6) adjusting for composition bias. All of these
are potentially important adjustments, and I found it instructive to see
what difference they make. To facilitate my discussion of these six adjust-
ments, I have created a data set of mean hours and wages by age group
from the 1980 Census comparable to Mulligan's CPS sample. Quantita-
tively, the most important adjustments are the first four, so I will discuss
them in some detail.
2.1 INCLUDING OLDER WORKERS
Both wages and hours vary relatively little for workers between the ages
of 35 and 55. Thus, in standard analyses of life-cycle data, most of the
variation in hours and wages comes from the difference between prime-
age and young workers. Since hours and wages differ for older workers
as well, this seems potentially a good reason for exploiting this addi-
tional variation in the data. In practice, I am rather skeptical that the
hours choices of older workers teach us much about the intertemporal
substitution elasticity. Mulligan tries to address two potential problems
for workers past the retirement age: the fact that social security changes
the incentives workers face, and the problem that the older workers for
whom we observe a wage are a highly selected group. Mulligan uses
data from the 1980 Census by assigning older workers the wages of
younger full-time workers in the same occupation and schooling group
and then comparing the imputed wages of those retiring with those who
continue working. This calculation of the composition bias adjusts for
selective retirement between groups but not for possible biases arising
from within group selection.
The fact that the social security system changes the after-tax wage is
incorporated in the tax calculations in the paper. But Mulligan acknowl-
edges that it is difficult to collapse the multitude of constraints and
implicit taxes into a single tax rate relevant for the cohort averages. More
importantly, the tax calculation does not incorporate the fact that work-
ers are first eligible to receive social security benefits at age 62 and Medi-
care at age 65. This omission is perfectly consistent with the model,
because benefit availability should not matter for the hours decisions of a140 • PISCHKE
"life-cycling" worker, since benefits are part of life-cycle wealth. But
social security and Medicare wealth are hard to borrow against to fi-
nance leisure earlier in life, and prudent consumers tend to be reluctant
to make use of the borrowing opportunities that are available. This con-
straint is relevant, because many individuals do not own substantial
assets other than durable goods even at ages close to retirement. The
median financial net worth of households with a male head age 55 to 61
in the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances is $5,000. Including housing
wealth, the median net worth is $94,000.1 believe that some of the spikes
in retirement rates at ages 62 and 65 are explained by the presence of the
social security system. Costa's (1995) work is a case in point. She finds
that the availability of army pensions for Union veterans after the Civil
War substantially changed the retirement behavior of those who quali-
fied for these pensions, suggesting that the presence of old-age benefits
matters for retirement decisions and that the effect does not operate
through wages.
Mulligan discusses another major difference between the old and the
young, which is the fact that the young are healthier. This is important to
the degree that health affects tastes for leisure directly. He finds little
empirical evidence for a direct effect of health on hours choices. He also
cites historical evidence to support his claim that health may not have
much of a direct effect on labor-supply behavior. The fact that older men
seemed to be in much worse health around the turn of the century but
worked more than the elderly do now is hardly convincing evidence that
health does not influence the taste for leisure. Americans are far richer
now and therefore may find it far easier to finance leisure at times when
it is particularly valuable. The social security disability and old-age pen-
sion programs make this easy even for individuals who have not pro-
vided for these circumstances on their own.
I am also unconvinced by the evidence presented by Mulligan on the
effect of health on hours choices. The Census also asks questions about
disabilities which limit the household member's ability to work or which
prevent him from working. These disability questions are available for
all respondents, and therefore they do not have to be imputed for the
age groups below age 51 as with data used by Mulligan. In the first three
rows of Table 1 I report the estimated elasticities from Mulligan's paper
(column 1) and my reestimates with the Census (column 2) for the vari-
ous age ranges he looks at. These estimates use hours for all men, not
just those working, since much of the variation in hours for older men
comes from the employment margin. I will have more to say on the
distinction between workers and nonworkers below. The point estimateComment • 141
Table 1 ESTIMATES OF THE INTERTEMPORAL ELASTICITY








































































Each entry represents the coefficient from a separate regression of the log of mean annual hours for an
age cell on the mean of the log of the hourly wage for the age cell (in rows 1-3) or on the log of the mean
of the hourly wage for the age cell (in rows 4-6). All regressions also include a constant and a linear
term in age. Regressions in column (3) also control for the fraction of the age group reporting a disability
which limits the kind or amount of work a person can do. Regressions in column (4) also control for the
fraction of the age group reporting a disability which prevents a person from working on a job. All cell
means are computed from the 1980 Census of Population 5% PUMS. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
"This estimate is not reported in the published version of Mulligan's paper and is taken from a previous
draft.
for the age group 25-55 is almost exactly the same, while our estimates
differ a bit for the samples including older men.
If I include the fraction of an age group who report a disability which
either limits or prevents work (columns 3 and 4 of Table 1), some of the
estimated elasticities fall substantially. Unlike Mulligan, I find no signifi-
cant intertemporal substitution effects for the age group 24-64 once
health status of the age group is controlled for. For the age group 24-79,
the estimated elasticities remain substantial, but the estimates differ by a
factor of 2 depending on the exact definition of the disability variable.
This is despite the fact that the raw correlation of the two disability mea-142 • PISCHKE
sures in the sample is 0.99! This makes me quite skeptical whether we are
able to control adequately for the effect of health in these regressions.
My skepticism is heightened by the fact that these regressions seem
rather sensitive to changes in the functional form used. When the arith-
metic average of the wage (i.e. the log of the average wage) is used as a
regressor instead of the geometric average (i.e. the average of the log
wages), I find substantially lower estimates for the elasticity once older
groups are included. This result is again in contrast to Mulligan's esti-
mates in his Table 3. The difference between the two wage measures
results from the fact that the geometric-average wage declines much
more strongly for workers over age 60, thus producing an age-wage
profile which tracks the age-hours profile much more closely when
older workers are included. This means that there is less need for the
health indicators to explain the behavior of hours for the elderly. While
the specification using the geometric-average wage may be more sensi-
ble, I find it more comforting that these functional form issues are not of
importance for the age group below 55.
Mulligan concludes that retirement might be a life event particularly
suitable for the study of intertemporal substitution. I find the complica-
tions introduced by using older workers overwhelming. Since the re-
sults are very sensitive to important specification issues, I feel that it is
much safer to rely on the age group below 55.1 will focus the rest of my
comments on them.
2.2 INCLUDING NONEMPLOYMENT
Not working at all during the year is a valid choice of hours, and studies
of intertemporal substitution have often neglected this margin because
we do not observe the wages of nonworkers. But the male employment
rate is clearly hump-shaped over the life cycle. In 1980, it was 93% at age
25, peaked around 95% for men in their thirties, and drops to 86% at age
55. Thus, the employment rate varies most for workers in their late
forties and fifties, a period when wages are rather stable. The combina-
tion implies that including nonworkers raises the estimated substitution
elasticity substantially because a little wage variation has to account for a
lot of hours variation. But I doubt that this is the full story. An important
reason why men do not work during their prime-age years (apart from
unemployment, which rarely lasts an entire year) is, again, health. The
fraction of workers reporting a disability which prevents them from
working rises from 1.4% at age 25 to 10% at age 55. In fact, this fraction
has a correlation with the employment rate of —0.95. Rows 1 and 2 of
Table 2 compare the estimates of the intertemporal substitution elasticity
for working men and for all men including nonworkers, controlling forComment • 143
Table 2 ESTIMATES OF THE INTERTEMPORAL ELASTICITY OF
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Each entry represents the coefficient from a separate regression of the log of mean annual hours for an
age cell on the log of the mean hourly wage for the age cell. All regressions also include a constant and a
linear term in age. Regressions in column (3) also control for the fraction of the age group reporting a
disability which limits the kind or amount of work a person can do. Regressions in column (4) also
control for the fraction of the age group reporting a disability which prevents a person from working on
a job. All cell means are computed from the 1980 Census of Population 5% PUMS. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
the fractions reporting a disability.
1 These health variables do not matter
for men below age 55 who are working (row 1), while they reduce the
estimates somewhat once we use hours for all men.
2.3 MISREPORTING OF HOURS AND WAGES
Answers to "usual weekly hours" questions in the Census Bureau sur-
veys are well known to produce spikes at 40 hours, particularly for men.
It seems plausible to me that some rounding by respondents masks
actual hours fluctuations over the life cycle. I also agree with the idea of
including nonwork investment activities, like job search in the measured
1. The estimates in Table 2 use the arithmetic average of the wage. I switch to this variable
here because this makes some of the later adjustments I wish to make much easier.144 • PISCHKE
hours. Hence, the time-diary data which Mulligan uses should in princi-
ple allow better inferences on the intertemporal substitution elasticity.
Unfortunately, the available time-diary sample is small and therefore
produces noisy means for the hours measure. This is very visible in
Mulligan's Figure 1. A salient feature in these data among the group 25-
55 years old are two outliers with low hours of about 1200 at age 54 and
about 900 at age 55. The observations for the next few ages are higher
again and lie between 1500 and 2000 hours. The data imply that the
typical man at age 55 who is employed at all worked less than 20 hours a
week. I find this implausible, given that the same age group reports more
than 40 hours in the CPS and Census. I doubt that the average worker in
this group spends more than 20 hours a week at the doctor or having
coffee breaks. I stress this issue because it is these two observations
which more than double Mulligan's estimate of the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution. When I replace annual hours for 54-year-olds by 1200
and for 55-year-olds by 900 in the Census data, my estimates change
from 0.59 to 1.32 for the specification using hours for all men including
nonworkers. Comparing this with Mulligan's numbers of 0.57 and 1.36
makes clear that these two data points drive the result. Moreover, the t-
statistic on the substitution elasticity falls from 23 to 4 when I make this
change, indicating that OLS agrees with me that these two data points
are very different from the rest of the sample.
Realizing that sampling error is important in the diary data and may
affect the estimates, Mulligan uses three other methods to adjust the
CPS data for possible reporting bias. He assumes that respondents may
report hours between the norm and the truth (the compression model)
or that some respondents report the norm rather than the truth (the liars
model). Both models are plausible, but their use requires either knowl-
edge of or an assumption about the degree of misreporting. Mulligan
gauges this quantity by comparing the standard deviation of hours by
age group in the CPS and in the diary data for the ages 25-55. Of course,
we know that for those ages the two outliers for 54- and 55-year-olds in
the diary data will have a big effect on the estimated standard deviation.
Therefore, these exercises do not address my concern with the diary
data either. The final method to adjust the CPS data is to discard every-
body reporting 40 hours. This idea relies on the strong assumption that
every report of 40 hours is erroneous. If this is incorrect, and some men
actually work 40 hours a week, even when their wages change, then this
adjustment will lead to an overestimate of the intertemporal substitution
elasticity. Since there are important institutional reasons which imply
that 40-hour responses may be roughly correct, we have reason to doubt
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Coffee breaks apart, why do weekly hours fluctuate for male workers?
We know that part-time work is rare for men before they reach retire-
ment age. For salaried workers, hours may vary, but this variation
should have no particular effect on pay during the current period. A
potential source in variation in weekly hours that remains is overtime by
hourly workers, even though Mulligan's indivisible-labor model ignores
this possibility if a work session is a day or longer. The questions in the
Census or CPS annual demographic supplement are ill suited to pick up
these variations. So I went to the 1979 merged Outgoing Rotation Group
(ORG) files of the CPS and recorded data on "hours worked last week."
These data come from throughout the year, and recall bias for this ques-
tion should be much less important than in the surveys asking about the
previous year. Thus, these data are likely to give a more accurate picture
of deviations of hours from their usual level, although I agree that they
are inferior to the continuous recording done in diary studies. I con-
structed annual hours by multiplying the CPS hours last week for the
age group with their weeks worked from the Census. I also did the same
construction with the "usual weekly hours" variable from the CPS. This
latter variable should give an answer very similar to the annual hours
from the Census. The result is shown in row 3 of Table 2, and a compari-
son with row 2 reveals that this is in fact true for the estimated elasticity,
although usual hours from the CPS tend to be somewhat lower than
usual hours from the Census. Using hours last week raises the estimated
elasticity a bit, but not dramatically (row 4). Like the diary hours, using
hours last week produces an annual hours measure which is below the
Census measure for older workers, but there is not much difference for
younger workers. In addition, the differences are not large: about 50
hours a year for workers aged 55. Thus, I believe that the adjustment
due to the diary hours goes in the right direction, but I am not convinced
of the magnitudes shown by Mulligan.
If hours are measured incorrectly, the measurement of the wage is also
affected. Mulligan tries to correct the wage measure by using the diary
hours to compute the hourly wage and instruments this measure with
the wage constructed from the CPS alone. Since the first stage of this
regression does not fit very well, the whopping elasticity estimate of
above 6 is not very informative. The sampling distribution of the just-
identified IV estimator has fat tails when the correlation of the instru-
ment with the endogenous regressor is low, so that it easily produces
crazy estimates.
Combining information from the Census and the CPS allows us to
exploit the superior wage measure from the CPS. I calculated hourly
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workers and used the reported hourly wage for hourly workers. At least
for hourly workers, this wage measure should be much more accurate
than dividing annual earnings by annual hours, even those collected
from a diary study. Row 5 in Table 2 shows that using this CPS wage
measure raises the estimated elasticity by 10 to 30%. Once we are consid-
ering hours fluctuations due to overtime, we should also adjust wages
for this. An hourly worker working more than 40 hours a week has to be
paid time and a half for the overtime hours according to the Fair Labor
Standards Act. For a work session where a worker is in the overtime
range, this becomes the relevant wage for the decision about hours. I
assume that hourly workers report the straight-time wage in the CPS
and label every hourly worker reporting more than 40 hours last week as
working overtime (thus neglecting multiple job holding). The wage of
these workers is 1.5 times the reported wage. This adjustment makes
little difference, as can be seen in row 6 of Table 2.
2.4 ON-THE-JOB TRAINING
Not all hours at work are actually spent in productive activities. Some
time may be spent accumulating more human capital. This means that
the wage for an hour of actual production is higher than the hourly wage
rate reported by a worker. Since accumulation of human capital tends to
be concentrated during the early years of a worker's life, making this
adjustment flattens the wage profile, and therefore increases the esti-
mated elasticity of substitution. Mulligan's Table 1 shows that the elastic-
ity estimate rises from 0.57 to 0.61 when training hours from the time-
diary data are used, or to 0.76 when the estimated hours from Heckman,
Lochner, and Taber (1998) are used. I am actually surprised that either
adjustment makes so little difference.
A number of assumptions go into this adjustment. We should only
deduct hours of work which are not compensated by the employer.
Thus, hours spent in firm-specific training, a large part of which may be
paid for by the employer, should not necessarily be deducted. The as-
sumptions in the paper with respect to the issue are actually relatively
conservative, since most on-the-job training seems to be general (see
Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1997). However, there is some empirical evi-
dence suggesting that employers also seem to pay for a good part of
general training (see, e.g., Barron, Berger, and Black, 1997). Acemoglu
and Pischke (1999) provide a theoretical rationale for this finding: If labor
markets are not competitive, and general training raises the rents which
employers may capture from the workers, then employers are willing to
invest in general skills. As a consequence, I suspect that Mulligan'sComment • 147
adjustment is an upper bound for the effect of general training, because
employers may well pay their workers even for most hours spent in
general training.
Mulligan works with the standard training model of Gary Becker and
Jacob Mincer, in which learning only takes place when the worker does
not engage in productive activities. An alternative, and probably comple-
mentary, approach is the learning-by-doing model, which implies that it
is an additional hour actually spent at work which makes the worker
more productive. This also means that the relevant value of an hour of
work has to be adjusted upwards when skill accumulation takes place.
The relevant price is not just the current wage but also the discounted
effect of the additional hour on all future wages, weighted appropriately
by the hours worked in the future. We would expect that this has the
same effect of making the correct wage profile flatter and therefore rais-
ing the estimated elasticity of substitution. The implications of this
model for intertemporal substitution have been studied by Shaw (1989).
However, she allows the effect of an hour of work today on wages next
year to depend on the current wage. She finds that a high current wage
enhances learning by doing, so that her estimates actually imply a
steeper and more concave profile for the true value of an hour of work,
because most learning by doing takes place during the high-wage years
when individuals are in their late thirties and forties. Using her esti-
mates of the human-capital production function, I imputed the corrected
value of an hour of work using the cohort means from the Census and
CPS. This is a crude way of doing things. It would be much preferable to
do this calculation with the micro data and aggregate up, because the
relationship between the wage next period and today's hours is rather
nonlinear. This can only be done with a panel, so I ignore Jensen's
inequality and feed average hours and wages into this function anyway.
The results are displayed in row 7 of Table 2. The intertemporal elasticity
of substitution falls by over a third. I do not want to defend these
estimates as a better adjustment of the effects of training. I rather view
them as an illustration of what can happen when some different esti-
mates on human-capital formation are used in place of the ones Mulli-
gan focuses on. I think we have too little empirical knowledge about the
form of the human-capital production function and the relative impor-
tance of different channels of on-the-job training, so that it remains
rather unclear whether adjusting for training actually raises or lowers
the elasticity of substitution.
Career concerns or rat races among young workers generate behavior
very similar to the learning-by-doing model. If more hours mean higher148 • PISCHKE
output, and employers use output to make inferences about the ability of
workers (to set future wages), then an additional hour worked today will
result in a payoff in the future. Since career concerns become less impor-
tant with age, hours choices are more distorted for the young. Unfortu-
nately, there seems to be no simple way of adjusting for the resulting
distortion in the hours. This is because in equilibrium employers take the
behavior of the workers into account in setting wages. They reward
inferred ability, not the fact that associates in law firms and assistant
professors have tried to jam the signal on ability by overly hard work.
This means that, without a lot of structure, observed wages and hours
by themselves will contain no information on how important career
concerns are. But career concerns likely imply a higher intertemporal
elasticity of substitution than we will typically estimate.
2.5 OTHER ADJUSTMENTS AND SUMMARY
The remaining adjustments are empirically much less important, at least
in the group of workers below retirement age. One is for taxes. Reported
wages are before taxes. As an individual's earnings rise with age, he or
she gets pushed into higher tax brackets. So the after-tax wage profile
will be flatter, once more generating a (slightly) higher elasticity.
Since we included nonworkers in the hours calculation, we have to
address the potential composition bias resulting from the fact that we do
not observe wages for these workers. This bias may differ by age. I like
the way Mulligan uses panel data to get at the composition bias. This is
again most important for older workers, because employment rates at
young ages vary less dramatically. I have followed an alternative strategy
myself, which is to assume that nonworkers are individuals with low
potential earnings. Consequently, I assigned them the lOth-percentile
wage within their schooling, race, and age cell. Like Mulligan's adjust-
ment, this approach also produced lower elasticities, but the difference
was equally minor.
Overall, I agree much more with the ideas underlying the specific
adjustments made to the life-cycle estimates by Mulligan than with some
of the empirical estimates he obtains. I find the results from the adjust-
ments which make the biggest difference, using older workers and using
diary data, the most dubious. I agree that many of the adjustments will
raise the estimated elasticity. But based on those where we have reliable
data, the elasticity seems to be more like 0.6 than 0.3, not out of the
ballpark of previous estimates. All this said, it still remains an open
question whether the hours choices of individuals over their life cycle
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3. The Termination ofAFDC Benefits
The second empirical exercise in the paper is very different from the
first. It examines the change in labor-supply behavior of women when
their AFDC benefits end because the youngest child turns 18. AFDC
rules impose a substantial tax rate up to 100% on the earnings of benefit
recipients, thus making work much less attractive before the youngest
child is age 18. In order to estimate the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution implied by this change in effective wages, Mulligan compares the
hours of women who received AFDC benefits when their youngest child
was 17, at the times when the child was 15 and 19. For example, in the
most restricted sample, average hours go up by 37 log points. Wages
have changed by -ln(l - tax rate), or -0.51 when the tax rate is 0.4.
Dividing these two numbers, you get the substitution elasticity of 0.73 in
the bottom right-hand corner of Mulligan's Table 5. Some mothers in the
sample will have received AFDC when their child was 15, and some will
not. This means that the change in the implicit tax rates differs for these
women. Mulligan assumes an average tax rate for the whole group. It
might seem preferable to use the micro-level heterogeneity in these tax
rates to estimate the effect of intertemporal substitution. But these tax
rates depend on labor-supply behavior, and Mulligan's method filters
out the variation which is solely due to the AFDC rules. This is effec-
tively an application of instrumental variables.
What is unfortunate is that we are not given more information about
the average tax rate, because the estimated elasticity depends fairly
strongly on the assumed rate. This could be done in principle by calculat-
ing the actual benefit reduction rate faced by the individuals in the micro
data. As a first approximation, I would neglect complications such as the
costs of obtaining earnings disregards in this exercise. Nevertheless, the
PSID probably does not have enough information to do this, because
surveys are only done once a year. The Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) collects monthly data on employment, income, and
participation in government programs and might be more suited for
such an analysis. It would also allow the researcher to incorporate partici-
pation in other government transfer programs which are tied to the
presence of a child in the household, primarily housing benefits.
Burtless (1990) suggests that the effective marginal tax rate resulting
from the combination of programs might well be as high as 0.8 or 0.9,
much above the base value of 0.5 assumed by Mulligan. I therefore
suspect that the more appropriate calculations in Mulligan's Table 5 are
the ones with the higher tax rates, producing the lower elasticities.150 • PISCHKE
Uncertainty about the estimated elasticity also results from the small
sample sizes in the PSID (unfortunately, I suspect that pooling all the
SIPP panels would yield just about as many, or as few, observations). For
the employment rates in Mulligan's Table 4 it is possible to calculate
standard errors from the information in the table. For the most restrictive
sample in column 5, the employment rate when the child is 15 rises from
0.35 with a standard error of 0.07 to 0.43 with a standard error of 0.06,
not a significant change. I imagine that the magnitudes of standard
errors on the hours would look similar. It would therefore be useful to
have these results corroborated in other samples before we draw strong
conclusions.
Even if we accept the finding as a fact that women raise their annual
hours by 37% when their AFDC benefits end, there is still the question of
whether this is really a response to a change in the value of work, and
therefore due to intertemporal substitution. Looking at consumption
changes to corroborate this interpretation is clever. Mulligan finds that
women reduce their food and housing expenditures by 22 cents for each
dollar of AFDC income they lose, close to Gruber's (1996) finding of 30
cents based on within-state changes in benefit levels. The benefit
changes Gruber analyzed should produce wealth effects, since they
were presumably unanticipated by recipients. Thus, the consumption
response in Mulligan's sample seems rather large.
But alternative explanations to forward-looking behavior are consis-
tent with a small consumption response as well. Other sources of in-
come, such as help from family and friends, may replace the previous
AFDC income and therefore help smooth consumption. The child itself
may start going to work between age 15 and 19 and contribute to the
income of the family. Some mothers start work or raise their hours, as we
have seen, and their earnings help keep their consumption up. But this
behavior may be purely myopic and have nothing to do with in-
tertemporal substitution. Another potential test of a forward-looking
versus a myopic explanation would be to compare the consumption and
labor-supply responses of mothers in states with different benefit levels.
The benefit level should not matter for the intertemporal substitution
story (only the tax rate matters, which is set federally). But women in a
high-benefit state like California may be in for more of a shock when
their benefits run out than their compatriots in a low-benefit state like
Texas. Unfortunately, I cannot think of a data set large enough to gener-
ate decent sample sizes for this by state. But until I see some further
evidence, I also remain skeptical that what we see in the behavior of
welfare mothers is intertemporal substitution.Discussion • 151
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Discussion
John Shea suggested that the exclusion of family size and composition
from the analysis could be a significant omission. He also pointed out
that the countervailing income and substitution effects of wage changes
on labor supply weaken the a priori case for a high elasticity of labor
supply. He mentioned evidence from studies of cab drivers, whose be-
havior apparently reflects a substitution effect but also an income effect,
as reflected in a weekly income target. Mulligan replied that his model
can give new insights into the interaction of substitution and income
effects, noting for example that, in his model, an increase in the real
wage will lead individuals to increase the number of work sessions but
reduce average session length.
David Laibson raised the issue of liquidity constraints, the existence of
which may confound efforts to estimate the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. For example, labor supply peaks in midlife, which is also
the time when family consumption needs are highest.
John Cochrane pointed out possible selection problems in the use of the
sample of elderly workers. For example, the observed decline in hours
and wages after age 65 could reflect a situation in which only lower-
productivity individuals continue to work, as they cannot afford to retire.152 • DISCUSSION
Responding to a comment by Pischke, Mulligan argued that the way
that human-capital accumulation is financed isn't critical; what is impor-
tant is that the rate of accumulation is higher for younger workers,
which should be interpreted as a higher implicit wage for those workers.
More generally, Mulligan stressed that it was not the intention of his
paper to consider all possible explanations for observed lifetime patterns
of hours and wages. Rather, the idea was to see how far we can get by
extending earlier research that takes the life-cycle model seriously.